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Abstract: 
This study examines the role of local law enforcement officers in the implementation of national anti-
terrorism policy within the context of Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy. Interview and 
survey responses are used to analyze the research question, how does local law enforcement implement 
this national security policy? The researcher finds that police officers provide valuable intelligence to 
this effort but that these officers are being underutilized.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“On Tuesday, our country was attacked with deliberate and massive cruelty. We have 
seen the images of fire and ashes and bent steel. … I can hear you. I can hear you, and 
the rest of the world hears you, and the people – and the people who knocked these 
buildings down will hear all of us soon.” – President Bush, 14 September 2001 
(www.PBS.org) 
“Let us renew our resolve against those who perpetrated this barbaric act and who plot 
against us still. In defense of our nation, we will never waver. In pursuit of al Qaeda and 
its extremist allies, we will never falter.” – President Obama, 11 September 2009 
(www.CBSNews.com) 
The events of September 11, 2001, are indelibly burned in the collective psyche of the 
people of the United States.  For most citizens, that day is one that parallels the “do you know 
where you were when” sentiment of the Kennedy assassination and the moon landing. Fear, 
anger, empathy, and sadness are just a few of the emotions felt by many who witnessed those 
tragic events live on television. And the repercussions of those events continue to reverberate 
today. 
Terrorism has always been a concern of the American public and government, but never 
as pronounced as the days following the events in New York City and Washington, D.C. on 
September 11, 2001. President Bush signed a $40 billion antiterrorism appropriations bill into 
law on September 14, 2001, with $5.8 billion designated for homeland security. May, 2002, saw 
the passage of a sweeping border security bill that increased the capabilities of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) as well as changed visa and passport protocols. Potential 
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targets such as airports and government installations increased security and other threats like 
bioterrorism received additional funding. The government responded to the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon with aggressive legislation resulting in immediate 
changes in how the United States approached the problem of terrorism both abroad and, as 
these examples illustrate, domestically (www.cqpress.com). 
The Kansas City region has not yet been attacked by any known terrorist individual or 
organization. However, there have been terrorism investigations in the area in recent years. 
There were at least two such investigations in 2010. The first was reported in May, 2010, and 
was an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) case resulting in the arrest of a Kansas City 
man who plead guilty to providing material support to Al Qaeda (www.ice.gov). The other 
investigation was conducted by the FBI in Kansas City and resulted in the arrest of a former 
congressman from Virginia who had been raising funds for terrorist organizations through the 
Missouri Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) (kansascity.fbi.gov). These cases are not as 
significant as the events of September 11, 2001, and did not result in legal changes, but they do 
indicate that terrorism activities are not limited to the East coast.   
Congress, through the power of the purse, was not the only governmental entity to be 
involved in making changes in how the United States fights domestic terrorism. The executive 
branch also made some important changes. The most significant change was probably the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was created in 2003 and assumed 
organizational control of more than twenty different agencies ranging from the INS to the Plum 
Island Animal Disease Center. Ostensibly, the purpose of this realignment was to provide a 
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more effective organization focused on protecting the American public from a variety of 
potential threats, including terrorism (www.dhs.gov). 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has also revamped their terrorism efforts. The 
number one priority of the FBI is now terrorism: if there is a terrorist event, all necessary 
resources will be diverted from other operations to aid counterterrorism efforts. Joint terrorism 
task forces (JTTF’s) have been created, staffed, and utilized in cities and regions around the 
country with the intention of improving response time and effectiveness as well as improving 
communications with other law enforcement organizations already on the ground when a 
terrorist event occurs. JTTF’s are lead by the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) but local police 
departments contribute with manpower and intelligence to these entities (www.fbi.gov). 
Herein lie the critical link to local law enforcement. Stealing a phrase from military 
lexicon, the “boots on the ground” are those persons who are the first to respond to any 
terrorist event. These “boots” may be line officers from the Lawrence, Kansas, police 
department or a task force in Overland Park, Kansas. Regardless of the location of the specific 
department, local law enforcement is usually best poised to interpret situations and take the 
first steps in either responding to, or, ideally, preventing, a terrorist event. They are responsible 
for initial intervention, collection of intelligence, and collaboration with other state or federal 
law enforcement entities. Their role is seldom well known as the FBI or other national agencies 
generally receive the credit, or blame, but their importance cannot go unrecognized. For better 
or worse, the United States’ first line of defense against terrorism is the local law enforcement 
officer. 
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This study analyzes local law enforcement’s implementation of national anti-terrorism 
policy. Recognizing the perspectives of this first line of defense is crucial to understanding their 
role in anti-terrorism efforts. These perspectives also provide national law enforcement officials 
and policy makers with information regarding how to better implement their anti-terrorism 
policies at this local level. Understanding the perspective of the “boots on the ground” will 
allow the generals in Washington, D.C., to better execute the “War on Terror.” 
These local level perspectives will be illuminated through the use of interviews and 
surveys of police officers from a variety of departments throughout the greater Kansas City, 
Missouri, region as well as other “benchmark” cities around the country. Nineteen officers were 
interviewed and over 400 surveys completed providing a substantially large data set for 
analysis. This data will be analyzed thus providing the desired insight into the role and function 
of local law enforcement in the national anti-terrorism effort. 
The next chapter will discuss in greater detail the terrorism threat to the United States, 
specifically highlighting the federal government’s responses to this threat, as well as  of the role 
of local law enforcement as part of this response. Chapter three will consider the theoretical 
implications of this study with particular emphasis on Michael LIpsky’s theory of “street-level 
bureaucracy.” Subsequent chapters will explain the methodology used for this study and the 
specific analytical techniques used to arrive at the reported results and conclusions. Finally, 
implications for theory, policy development, and implementation will be discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 Local law enforcement departments have a significant and meaningful role to play in the 
implementation of national anti-terrorism policy (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Smith et al 2001; Rubin 2004; 
Docobo 2005; Bellavita 2005; Clovis 2006; Caruson and MacManus 2007; National Preparedness 
Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; Eack 2008; Morreale and Lambert 2009; Atkinson and Wein 2010; 
Jones and Supinski 2010). However, there is debate regarding the specific role local police departments 
do and should play in this effort. This chapter will focus on illuminating the different ways local law 
enforcement officers are viewed with regard to preventing terrorism. 
 The first task, then, is to define terrorism. Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism, in 
part, as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by 
subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Domestic terrorism, the primary subject of this paper, is 
defined as “activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended – (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” according to title 18 of the United States Code. 
These definitions, created by Congress, are only as meaningful as the interpretations and applications of 
those words by the officials charged with fighting terrorism within the United States. 
 The role of local police officers in combating terrorism is only significant, however, if terrorism is 
actually a threat worthy of fighting. The Oklahoma City federal building bombing and the first attack on 
the World Trade Center buildings in the early 1990’s are examples of this threat and also illustrate that 
this is not a new phenomenon (Rubin 2004). These two major terrorist events were not as galvanizing as 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., and New York City. Currently, there is 
still the perception of a threat within the United States (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Hoffman 2002; Bergen 
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and Hoffman 2010). In 2009, 43 Americans, associated with militant Sunni groups, were charged or 
convicted of participating in terrorist activities (Bergen and Hoffman 2010). International terrorist 
organizations, specifically al Qaeda, have also increased their efforts to recruit and utilize American 
citizens as active participants in terrorist plots or as members of their support network responsible for 
fundraising and providing other services and supplies as needed for their jihad (Bergen and Hoffman 
2010). Building off the formal definitions described above, terrorism can be generalized to be an 
instrumental attempt by an individual or group to inflict both physical and psychological harm to the 
intended target country or group of people (Hoffman 2002).  
  Nineteen officers were interviewed for this study and all of them had slightly different 
definitions of terrorism. One subject gave what could be considered a general, even generic, definition, 
stating that “terrorism is the act of creating fear within a society in order to accomplish some type of 
goal that an individual or a group may have.” Another officer defined terrorism within a specifically 
United States context:  
“Terrorism is any overt act, any planning of an overt act, that would be specifically targeted 
against U.S. citizens or the government, to either destroy, kill, maim, or change policy.”  
 
Yet other subjects took an even more hard-line perspective, such as one officer who believes that 
terrorism is “an act of war.” But one officer succinctly described the formidable task of defining 
terrorism, saying, “Defining terrorism is difficult. You have to realize that one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s patriot.” As these definitions and explanations illustrate, there is no consensus on a precise 
definition of terrorism. However, there are some common themes worth mentioning: (1) there is at 
least the threat of violence; (2) there is generally some type of ideology prompting the decision to take 
violent action; and (3) there is some specific goal of influencing the government or, at least, society in 
some manner. For the purposes of this study, when referencing terrorism, it is this loose definition that 
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is being utilized for this study as it conforms most closely to those provided by the officers themselves 
while still maintaining key elements of more formalized definitions described earlier. 
 The next important task is to define anti-terrorism policy. Domestic terrorism will be the focus 
of this study since that is the only type of terrorism that local law enforcement can realistically help 
prevent. Additionally, anti-terrorism is understood to be terrorism prevention while counter-terrorism is 
will be treated as responses to an actual act of terrorism. What, then, is anti-terrorism policy? One way 
to define anti-terrorism would be to choose a particular federal policy, such as the Patriot Act, or set of 
guidelines or regulations, such as the priorities of the FBI. Considering the relative uniqueness of this 
study, such a definition is too specific. Instead, all anti-terrorism policy, regardless of the type or nature 
of said policy, will be regarded appropriate. This definition of anti-terrorism policy may be confusing to 
participants in this study. The interviews indicated that this concern may be accurate, however, after 
explanation, all interview subjects had no difficulty answering the questions posed. The impact of this 
definition on the surveys may be more profound, and unknown to the researcher, but as the results 
chapter will demonstrate, the similarities between interview and survey responses indicates there is less 
of a problem in this regard then may have been predicted. 
 Numerous agencies are involved in the national anti-terrorism effort, but a few are more 
directly responsible for carrying out this mission. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) are both directly involved in this effort. Figure 2-1 provides a general flow 
chart that illustrates some of the responsibilities carried out by these two agencies. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI) is the primary terrorism-fighting agency within the DOJ. The FBI has always been 
responsible for protecting the United States, domestically, from terrorist threats. However, this national 
security imperative has not always been the top priority for the FBI. A look at the change in the FBI’s 
appropriations between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2004 illustrates how the priority of the FBI was 
altered following the events of September 11, 2001: In FY 2001, 49% of FBI appropriations were 
8 
 
designated to criminal investigations while 32% of the appropriations were designated to national 
security (defined, per the FBI, as counterterrorism and counterintelligence). By FY 2004, a dramatic 
change occurred in these appropriations with 34% designated to criminal investigations and 40% to 
national security efforts (The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001, 2004, page 10). In 
addition, the FBI website states that the current top priority for the FBI is to “Protect the United States 
from terrorist attack” with the second priority, indirectly related to the first, to “Protect the United 
States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage” (www.fbi.gov, Quick Facts). 
 The federal government of the United States also created the DHS following the events of 
September 11, 2001, and part of this department’s responsibility is to protect the United States from 
terrorism, as well as other threats. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Secret Service are examples of agencies falling under the umbrella 
of DHS that have, as part of their focus, the imperative to assist with anti-terrorism efforts (see Figure 2-
1). The TSA provides airport security, ICE assists with handling foreign nationals in the United States 
illegally, and the Secret Service investigates financial crimes, many of which are tied to terrorism 
activities.1 
 Local law enforcement has been viewed as being both a responsive entity and as a preventive 
force (National Preparedness Guidelines 2007). Local police departments are widely recognized as being 
part of the first responders to a terrorist incident (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Rubin 2004; Caruson and 
MacManus 2007; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 
2009; Morreale and Lambert 2009). These local agencies are frequently tasked with target hardening 
and response activities. Target hardening essentially is making potential targets more difficult to attack 
through the implementation of appropriate security measures. Response activities take place after an 
attack has occurred and include, but are not limited to, the following actions: (1) securing the scene to 
                                                          
1
 See the TSA, ICE, Secret Service, and DHS websites for more details. 
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keep non-emergency personnel from entering; (2) rescue of injured persons; and (3) neutralization 
efforts intended to apprehend the perpetrators or to limit additional damage. Target hardening and 
response are being considered similar because they both involve reacting to a specific risk resulting in 
strategic, reactionary actions (Rubin 2004; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; 
Chenoweth and Clarke 2009). New York police officers, for example, on September 11, 2001, were some 
of the first responders to the World Trade Center. This role by local law enforcement officials and 
departments necessitates recognition of potential targets, strengthening defenses against attack against 
these targets, and developing contingency plans in the event of a terrorist attack on these targets or any 
other entities within their jurisdiction (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Rubin 2004; Caruson and MacManus 
2007; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Stinson et al. 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009; 
Morreale and Lambert 2009).  
Additionally, law enforcement is called on to cooperate and collaborate with other jurisdictions 
(to include relevant federal, state, regional, and local agencies). Such interactions are a necessary 
condition for rapid response to a terrorist event (Riley and Hoffman 1995; Caruson and MacManus 
2007; National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Chenoweth and Clarke 2009). Responding to terrorist 
incidents and hardening potential targets is a reactionary function local police departments do need to 
actively participate in for local, state, and federal agencies to effectively deal with terrorist events. 
 The media and public frequently focus on this reactionary function of local law enforcement. 
However, little attention has been given to the preventive role of these officers. Essentially, prevention 
of terrorism is conceptually defined as engaging suspects prior to an actual act of terrorism (Donohue 
and Kayyem 2002; Bellavita 2005; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and Cannon 2007; National Preparedness 
Guidelines 2007; Atkinson and Wein 2010; Jones and Supinski 2010). There are a number of ways this 
can be accomplished. Police officers, through investigations of other crimes, may bring to light terrorism 
plots. For example, terrorists have a need to fund or supply their missions and often engage in other 
10 
 
crimes (such as robbery) that are tangentially related to their larger goals (Smith et al. 2001; Donohue 
and Kayyem 2002; Docobo 2005; Atkinson and Wein 2010). Police officers also can contribute 
intelligence to a broader anti-terrorism information network, sometimes simply by reporting suspicious, 
but not necessarily illegal, activity (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; National Preparedness Guidelines 
2007; Eack 2008; Jones and Supinski 2010). Collaboration with federal agencies on specific investigations 
is another way local law enforcement officers can help prevent terrorism (Docobo 2005; Clovis 2006; 
National Preparedness Guidelines 2007; Eack 2008; Atkinson and Wein 2010; Jones and Supinski 2010). 
Through investigation, intelligence gathering, and collaboration, local law enforcement is, or can be, 
significantly involved in national efforts to prevent terrorism events. 
 Figure 2-1 illustrates how local law enforcement fits into this national anti-terrorism effort. As 
this flow chart demonstrates and as was explained briefly above, local law enforcement is an integral 
part of national anti-terrorism policy implementation. Police officers are the “front lines of the war 
against terror” and, as such, have a prominent place in this nationwide effort (Jones and Supinski 2010). 
They fulfill this role by working closely with numerous federal agencies. The National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC), the U.S. Attorney’s office, ICE and the Secret Service are examples of federal agencies 
that occasionally collaborate with local law enforcement departments. These collaborations are 
relatively infrequent but police officers do have more contact with other federal agencies. 
 Local police departments actively participate in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF’s), Fusion 
Centers (also known as Terrorism Event Watch [TEW] centers), and Community Oriented Policing (COP). 
JTTF’s are cooperative organizations bringing together local, state, and federal agencies to investigate 
suspected terrorist activities. These task forces are headed by an FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and 
are comprised of executive boards and other committees that include state officials as well as officers 
from area and regional law enforcement departments. JTTF’s are central locations for collecting 
information and acting on terrorism-related leads. Information is also provided to local departments 
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about current terrorist threats and related officer safety concerns. JTTF’s are poised to respond directly 
to terrorism events in a timely manner anywhere within the JTTF’s jurisdiction. There are over 100 JTTF’s 
nationwide with at least one located in every state (information found on the FBI website). 
 Fusion centers, by comparison, are solely intended to collect, analyze, and disseminate 
intelligence. These intelligence centers, while sponsored and funded by DHS, are decentralized. Local 
and regional law enforcement officials provide manpower for these centers with very little direct input 
from DHS or any other federal agency. DHS funds these centers but they are otherwise operated by local 
and regional personnel. They are horizontal in nature, meaning that intelligence is collected at any 
Fusion Center, analyzed, and then made available to any other center. Any agency can provide 
information to fusion centers, or alternately they can retrieve intelligence. A piece of intelligence 
discovered in Kansas City, for example, may be utilized for an ongoing terrorism investigation in New 
York City. Fusion centers do not directly engage in investigations; rather, they function as an intelligence 
repository and make this intelligence available to agencies that do investigative work. Currently, only a 
handful of Fusion Centers exist, but the long-term goal is to increase the number of these centers in the 
coming years (Eack 2008; DHS website). 
 COP efforts are less directly tied to anti-terrorism efforts. Instead, Community Oriented Policing 
is geared towards increasing the presence of police officers in local communities and developing 
stronger relationships with these neighborhoods (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and 
Connon 2007; Jones and Supinski 2010). Although these relationships may not always have anti-
terrorism implications, they provide the foundation for closer ties between local communities and police 
officers. The stronger this relationship, the more likely that suspicious terrorist activity will be noticed 
and, more importantly, reported to the police. This potential of increased reporting by citizens increases 
the “eyes and ears” capabilities of local law enforcement thereby improving the overall anti-terrorism 
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effort (Smith et al. 2001; Docobo 2005; Friedmann and Cannon 2007; Jones and Supinski 2010; DOJ 
website).2 
 Local law enforcement clearly has a role to play within the national anti-terrorism effort. 
Therefore, it is useful to consider the perspectives of these officers when considering the 
implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Their beliefs about terrorism, the federal government’s policy, 
as well as their role in this effort all impact the execution of this policy. Ignoring their opinions is unwise 
and thus this study will examine in detail these perspectives. 
 Terrorism, while difficult to define, is considered a serious ongoing threat to the United States. 
Federal agencies have been charged with gathering intelligence and investigating suspected terrorists 
and these efforts require the assistance of local law enforcement departments. This study, therefore, 
provides an important contribution to this literature in that it looks at local level involvement from the 
perspective of line and command officers. The next chapter will discuss the theory being employed in 
this study thereby providing the final foundational piece needed for analyzing the role of local law 
enforcement as implementer of national anti-terrorism policy. 
  
                                                          
2
 The COP program is not directly considered in this study; rather this program is examined in terms of the 
relationship between the police and local citizens, as elicited in the interviews, and in terms of the “front line” role 
of local law enforcement officers. 
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Chapter 3: Theory 
 Understanding bureaucratic institutions, including police departments, and their behavior is the 
topic of much theoretical discussion. A fundamental concern within this literature centers on how 
politically elected officials ensure that non-elected personnel implement their policy decisions. This is 
the familiar principal-agent conundrum: how do principals, elected officials in this example, get the 
agents, non-elected employees, to carry out the mandates called for by policy (Shepsle and Bonchek 
1973; Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005). This implies that bureaucratic institutions have discretion to 
make decisions regarding the implementation of policy. Often this is analyzed from an institutional 
perspective where an entire bureaucratic agency is examined and trends regarding compliance with 
policy are considered (Shepsle and Bonchek 1973; Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005). Information 
asymmetry is a primary assumption of this theory which assumes that the bureaucrat has information or 
knowledge that the policy decision maker does not possess (Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005).  
 John E. Chubb, in 1985, examined the relationship between principles and agents with regards 
to the awarding and distribution of grant monies. Two key findings from Chubb’s study are particularly 
relevant to this discussion. The first conclusion is that there are often multiple principles, such as 
Congress and the President, and the second is that there are frequently different goals between 
principles and agents resulting in distribution of grant money that is not necessarily congruent with the 
original intent (Chubb 1985). Sean Nicholson-Crotty (2004) concluded that goal conflict between federal 
principles and state agents is central to understanding the effectiveness of Medicaid and antinarcotics 
funding. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) built on Chubb’s work by stating that analyzing separate parts of the 
principle-agent structure is not as useful as considering the entire process. This approach contends that 
to fully understand the dynamics of the principle-agent relationship it is imperative that the researcher 
analyze the problem from both perspectives (Nicholson-Crotty 2004). This relationship of information 
asymmetry, goal incongruence, and multiple principles is not necessarily static. Rather, these 
14 
 
characteristics of principle-agent interaction are dynamic and subject to change over time (Waterman 
and Meier 1998). The principles may change, learning may take place, and ultimately goals may change 
resulting in a relationship that evolves over time (Waterman and Meier 1998).  
This discussion of the principle-agent theory provides an explanation to the fundamental 
question underlying this area of study: how do principles hold agents accountable? Michael Lipsky 
(1980) provides more specific analysis of this explanation by closely analyzing the agents in this 
relationship. Lipsky (1980), in his seminal work, examines the distribution of goods, services, and 
regulations by “street-level bureaucrats”. These bureaucrats may be teachers, health care workers, 
social security employees, building inspectors, and even police officers all responsible for providing the 
public with specific resources ranging from education to financial assistance (Lipsky 1980). Regardless of 
the policy, “street-level bureaucrats” are tasked with its implementation and these individuals are the 
subject of Lipsky’s (1980) book.  
The underlying theme of Lipsky’s (1980) book is based on the concept of goal incongruence from 
the principle-agent theory. Lipsky (1980) described this incongruence in terms of street-level discretion. 
Fundamentally, street-level bureaucrats often have different motivations and incentives than managers 
and other principles (Lipsky 1980; Moore 1990; Gianakis 1994; Clark-Daniels and Daniels 1995; Daniels 
et al 1999; Anagnostopoulos 2003; Walker and Gilson 2003; May and Wood 2003; Keiser et al. 2004; 
Evans and Harris 2004; Bergen and While 2005; Dickson-Gomez 2007; Hupe and Hill 2007; Goldstein 
2008; Proundfoot and McCann 2008; Satterlund et al. 2009). For example, a manager may want a 
bureaucrat to be fiscally responsible while the agent may be more interested in providing her clients 
with as much benefit as possible. Presumably, the principle’s primary motivation is to have an effectively 
implemented policy. Street-level bureaucrats, on the other hand, may be motivated by job security, 
satisfaction, or other factors independent of actual implementation outcomes (Lipsky 1980). 
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The ability of agents to exercise this discretion is due to their relative autonomy in the execution 
of their respective jobs (Lipsky 1980). Street-level bureaucrats frequently are left to implement policy 
independent of direct oversight from management (Lipsky 1980). Teachers, for example, are given 
conditions they are expected to satisfy yet are typically isolated from management while providing 
services for their clients (the students in this case). This autonomy allows the street-level bureaucrat to 
act based on their own motivations and incentives. 
Policy ambiguity is another circumstance that allows for street-level discretion regarding 
implementation (Lipsky 1980). This ambiguity can be a symptom of a policy being overly specific so as to 
be contradictory or being too general and vague (Lipsky 1980). Decisions made within this context 
require the street-level bureaucrat to act based on her own interpretation of the policy which again 
allows for discretion (Lipsky 1980; Lynxwiler 1983; Worden 1989; Satterlund et al. 1994; Daniels et al. 
1999; Hill 2003; Evans and Harris 2004; Bergen and While 2005). Veteran’s Affairs employees 
responsible for allocating educational benefits often are faced with choosing between several different 
legal mandates when making their decisions. The complexity of the policies, and the confusion this 
complexity can cause, allows the street-level bureaucrat to apply the policy options he prefers 
irrespective of the bureaucracy’s preferences. 
Information asymmetry can also add to policy ambiguity and confusion. The agents may have 
information that the principles lack or vice versa (Lipsky 1980; Winter 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 
2008). Lacking accurate and timely information can change how a policy is implemented since street-
level bureaucrats can only act based on the information they have available (Lipsky 1980).  
Finally, street-level bureaucrats are often responsible to multiple principles (Lipsky 1980). 
Political elites in Congress or a state legislature represents one possible principle, bureaucratic 
leadership represents yet another principle, and direct management represents still a third principle to 
any one agent (Lipsky 1980). Additionally, street-level bureaucrats also find themselves responsible to 
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still another principle: their clients (Lipsky 1980). Street-level bureaucrats, depending on the nature of 
their job, must please the principles previously mentioned as well as satisfy their clients (Lipsky 1980). 
Police officers must always be cognizant of the citizens they serve when they make decisions. 
Sometimes, these concerns may actually outweigh those of their supervisors since they may interact 
with the community more than with the commanding officers. 
Lipsky’s (1980) work clearly augments other principle-agent studies. The key elements of these 
other theories are present in Lipsky’s (1980) book. But, Lipsky (1980) has applied these concepts to the 
street-level bureaucrat in an attempt to explain why implementation of policy is not always congruent 
with the stated goals. 
This theory has been applied to numerous situations where street-level bureaucrats are charged 
with implementing policy. Four general classifications of relevant professions are most prevalent for the 
purposes of this study: education, regulation, health and social work, and policing. Previous research in 
each of these professions utilizing the street-level bureaucracy framework will help to clarify the theory 
and provide guidance for this specific study of the implementation of national security policy by local 
law enforcement. 
Policy is created by the federal government, the state government, as well as the local 
government with the expectation that street-level bureaucrats will carry out this policy (Meier 1984; 
Anagnostopoulos 2003; Silin and Schwartz 2003; Goldstein 2008). Whether trying to implement a 
federal mandate like “No Child Left Behind” (Goldstein 2008) or a school district policy 
(Anagnostopoulos 2003), teachers must first interpret the policy expectations and then decide how to 
enact these requirements within their classroom. Teachers are, in a practical sense, free to make 
decisions regarding this implementation in a manner consistent with their personal preferences (Meier 
1984; Anagnostopoulos 2003; Silin and Schwartz 2003; Goldstein 2008). This discretion is constituent 
with the expectations of Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucratic behavior (Lipsky 1980). 
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 Regulators are another class of bureaucrat where this theory has been applied. Industry 
regulators (Lynxwiler et al. 1983), environmental regulators (Fineman 2000) and housing inspectors 
(May and Wood 2003) are examples of this theoretical application. As would be expected, these 
bureaucrats have considerable discretion in the execution of their duties (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 
2000; May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). Intuitively, these jobs appear to be fertile 
ground for street-level discretion and the literature shows this to be true (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 
2000; May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). These bureaucrats interact with citizens 
directly, in many cases, and how they choose to assess penalties for violations or assist those citizens 
will have a direct impact on how communities develop over time (Lynxwiler et al. 1983; Fineman 2000; 
May and Wood 2003; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). This influence based on street-level decision-
making has clear policy implications, especially when the actions of these regulators are aggregated to 
the local, state, and national levels (Proudfoot and McCann 2008). 
 A third broad area of research employing Lipsky’s theory is the field of health care and other 
related social work. Welfare policy (Keiser et al. 2004), social security disability policy (Keiser 2001), and 
nursing (Walker and Gilson 2003; Bergen and While 2005) are all instances where the theory of street-
level bureaucracy has been applied. As would be expected, these bureaucrats are all expected to carry 
out specific policies yet they have considerable autonomy and discretion regarding how to implement 
these policies (Moore 1990; Clark-Daniels and Daniels 1995; Keiser 2001; Walker and Gilson 2003; Evans 
and Harris 2004; Keiser et al. 2004; Bergen and While 2005; Dickson-Gomez et al. 2007). The opinions, 
values, and beliefs of these individual bureaucrats will have a direct impact on how they interpret and 
implement policies and there is little actual accountability that supervisors can have given the autonomy 
of these professionals (Moore 1990; Walker and Gilson 2003; Evans and Harris 2004; Keiser et al. 2004; 
Bergen and While 2005). 
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 Studies have also analyzed police officer behavior and decision-making from the Lipsky 
perspective. Some of these research inquiries have focused on the decision making process used by 
police officers when deciding how to handle violators of the law (Worden 1989; Donahue 1992; Meehan 
1993; Novak et al.; Wilkins and Williams 2009). Another strand of research has investigated the means 
by which police officers can be held accountable to supervisors and the community (Brehm and Gates 
1993; Gianakis 1994; Daniels et al. 1999; Cheung 2005). A third dominant theme considers race in terms 
of profiling as well as representation within the profession itself (Seron et al. 2004; Wilkins and Williams 
2009). Studies within this field provide supportive evidence of the expectation that increased rules may 
actually lead to more discretion (Daniels et al. 1999) and that there are differences between supervisors 
and patrol officers in their perception of what their respective job’s entail (Gianakis 1994). Yet, there has 
been very little analysis of how these street-level bureaucrats implement federal policies. 
This discussion of the principle-agent theory, Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory, and the 
applications of Lipsky’s theory lead to several theoretical expectations. First, the goals of street-level 
bureaucrats may differ from those of their supervisors. Second, principles and agents may not have 
knowledge of the same information. Third, there may be more than one principle overseeing the 
implementation of policy. Fourth, street-level bureaucrats have discretion in making decisions regarding 
the implementation of policy. Finally, the implementation of policy may ultimately be different than 
what was originally intended. 
Lipsky’s theory suggests that national anti-terrorism policy will only be as effective as those 
charged with its implementation. The previous chapter demonstrated the role local level law 
enforcement has to play in this effort thus suggesting that this national security policy depends on these 
specific street-level bureaucrats for successful policy implementation. As a result, local-level law 
enforcement officials are a necessary piece of this policy and are an equally necessary unit of analysis if 
understanding of anti-terrorism policy is to be complete. 
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Federal anti-terrorism policy filters down to line officers through agencies like the FBI and DHS, 
through state agencies, and then through the hierarchy within their own department. Regardless of the 
mandates within these policies, these local officers may have different goals and, given their 
discretionary capabilities, they may choose to act on their own goals rather than those of their 
superiors. According to one officer interviewed for this study, “police officers of law enforcement 
agencies … don’t necessarily wake up every morning saying, ‘How am I going to prevent terrorism today 
in my jurisdiction.’ That’s not where their daily activities take them.” Regardless of federal mandates 
regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation, officers may have different goals that involve carrying 
out other duties, as implied by the above quote. 
Information asymmetry is particularly relevant to this research. National security classifications 
often limit the amount of information and feedback given to local police departments, particularly line 
officers. An officer commenting on the survey used for this study stated that “policy is not as much the 
problem as is the lack of information sharing by the federal government.” This lack of information 
sharing can strain the principle-agent relationship while also perhaps discouraging implementation in 
accordance with federal mandates. 
Police officers have many principles attempting to hold them accountable. Supervisors within 
their department are one level of principles. Local politicians are yet another. Federally, there are FBI, 
DHS, and even ICE officials to whom line officers must answer, specifically with regards to anti-terrorism 
policy implementation. These different principles may, or may not, share similar policy goals therefore 
creating a climate of ambiguity and confusion allowing for even greater levels of discretion by the 
officers as they must choose which goals to represent. 
 The previous paragraphs indicate some of the opportunities for police officers to act based on 
their own goals or interests. This discretion is utilized by police officers daily, irrespective of the policy 
being implemented. Whether a traffic stop where the officer decides to give a warning instead of a 
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ticket or an investigation of a suspected terrorist, officers have ample opportunity to make decisions 
based on their interpretations of policy or based solely on their own goals. 
 Information asymmetry, goal incongruence, multiple principles, and officer discretion can lead 
to implementation of policy that may differ from the original intent. Regardless of what the FBI desires 
of local law enforcement, for example, individual police officers have the discretion to act in a manner 
inconsistent with those FBI goals. The reasons for this implementation deviation may differ from officer 
to officer, but the end result is similar: implementation that may not conform to the mission of the 
federal government. 
 This application of Lipsky’s theory to local law enforcement officials prompts several specific 
questions that require an answer. How is national security anti-terrorism policy implemented by local 
law enforcement? This question serves as the overarching research question for this study. Based on the 
previous discussion regarding the importance of local-level police officers and departments in this larger 
anti-terrorism effort, coupled with a greater understanding of how street-level bureaucrats actually 
implement policy, it is necessary to examine this specific case of street-level bureaucratic 
implementation of national policy. This question, therefore, is the foundation and backdrop for this 
investigation. 
 The research question posed above, however, illicit other, more specific questions regarding the 
role of local-level law enforcement in the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy. Do local-
level law enforcement officials have an understanding of this policy, both nationally and locally? How do 
local police officials interpret this policy? What role do they see themselves filling in this implementation 
process? 
 These questions necessitate the investigation of even more specific inquiries. What is the nature 
of the relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement? Do local police 
departments have the resources necessary to implement anti-terrorism policy? Have there been any 
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consequences of this relatively recent emphasis on anti-terrorism? For example, have the daily tasks of 
police officers changed? Have job duties and responsibilities changed? Are other crimes now being 
under-investigated in favor of terrorism-related cases? 
 Finally, what is the way forward in the minds of local level police officers and anti-terrorism 
policy? In what ways do these local-level officials feel they can be better utilized? And, from the 
perspective of these officers, how can anti-terrorism policy be improved? 
 Answering this litany of questions will serve as a test of Lipsky’s theory and will provide practical 
information and analysis for officers tasked with preventing terrorism in the United States. Lipsky’s 
assumption of street-level bureaucratic discretion and the expectations that follow this assumption will 
be examined through the use of surveys and interviews of numerous police officers from the greater 
Kansas City, Missouri, area and other similar communities. The analysis, results, and conclusions will also 
likely provide insight into what is being done well and what may require additional work on the part of 
local-level law enforcement as well as federal agents responsible for implementing anti-terrorism policy. 
  
22 
 
Chapter 4: Research Design 
 This chapter will outline, describe, and detail the process by which the questions posed in 
Chapter 3 will be answered. Fundamentally, these answers will be found through surveys and 
interviews. The process of creating the questions for the interviews and the surveys will be explained in 
detail and the decision making process regarding subject selection for both the surveys and interviews 
will also be described. The process of conducting the interviews and administering the surveys will also 
be explained in detail. Finally, basic descriptions of the analyses to be undertaken will be presented but 
much of this discussion will be saved for Chapter 5. 
Interviews: 
 The original intent of this study was to conduct interviews with police officers from the 
Lawrence Police Department, the University of Kansas Campus Police, and the Kansas City, Missouri, 
Police Department. The questions to be asked were intended to illicit responses that would illuminate 
the perspective of these local law enforcement officers regarding national anti-terrorism policy. Below is 
an explanation for why some of the questions were included and what prompted the specific structuring 
of these particular questions of interest. A complete list of the planned questions can be seen in 
Appendix A. 
 The first few questions are just basic demographic and background questions. The intended 
purpose for including these questions is that they allow the researcher to better determine comparable 
relationships between different subjects. For example, gender, age, ideology, position/rank, training, 
and service time with their current department provide the opportunity to see if patterns emerge 
among different subjects with regards to their responses to other interview questions. Subjects were 
asked their names but only for acknowledgement of their willingness to participate in the interview. 
 Creating a comfortable interview setting was of importance as people are more likely to share if 
they are at ease. Questions like “Why did you want to become a police officer?” were crafted for this 
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explicit purpose. Not all subjects were asked this question as a good rapport was already developed 
prior to the actual interview. Regardless, this question was available to the interviewer to help create an 
environment conducive to a productive interview experience. 
 The above mentioned questions, and those like them, do not lend themselves well to eliciting 
information and opinions about the role of local level law enforcement officers relative to the 
implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Before delving into questions directly related to this issue, 
other background questions regarding anti-terrorism policy were asked of all subjects. ‘What is your 
unit’s anti-terrorism policy?”, “How often have you had cause to investigate a suspected terrorist 
incident?”, and “How much of a threat is terrorism within your community?” are questions designed to 
accomplish this goal of illuminating local level law enforcement knowledge of anti-terrorism policy. 
Answers to these questions would help provide a baseline for understanding the current role of local 
law enforcement officers. 
 For example, answers to the question “What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy?” would provide 
information about what the subject knows about anti-terrorism policy. These answers may provide 
information on the subject’s view of how anti-terrorism efforts are, or should be, implemented at the 
local level. The variety of potential answers to this one question provide opportunities for learning more 
about how police officers understand anti-terrorism policy, a necessary prerequisite for fully 
appreciating, understanding, and analyzing responses to other questions. 
 Demographic, background, and basic knowledge questions are relatively straight-forward and 
can be limiting in the scope of possible responses. Questions such as the following were also asked of 
each subject: “What is terrorism?”, “How do you view your role in the broader anti-terrorism effort 
nationwide?”, and “How would you change the national anti-terrorism policy?” These questions require 
the subject to apply their understanding of anti-terrorism policy to their current position as a local police 
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officer. This synthesis of concepts can result in responses that will be more frank and will reveal their 
genuine opinions regarding the implementation of national anti-terrorism policy. 
 The interview questions were submitted to the Human Subjects Committee for the University of 
Kansas, Lawrence Campus (HSCL) in November of 2010. In addition to the proposed interview questions, 
a consent form and description of the study were also submitted to the HSCL. This study, to include the 
consent form and interview questions, was approved by the HSCL on November 23, 2010. This approval 
validated that protocols for working with human subjects were adhered to and would be implemented 
by the researcher throughout the interviewing process. The primary protocols of interest for this study 
involve confidentiality and accuracy. Each subject signed a written consent form and stated their 
willingness to participate in the interview audibly. All interviews were digitally recorded (audio only) and 
these recordings are stored in a safe location. Subjects will not be referenced by name in any written 
product in accordance with the confidentiality agreement. These protocols help ensure accuracy of the 
information provided and also provide the subjects with the confidence that their responses will never 
be used to harm them professionally, emotionally, or intellectually. In the event a subject’s response is 
to be quoted directly, a pseudonym will be used for identifying the subject thus allowing for the 
publication of their response without compromising their anonymity. A copy of the consent form and 
other HSCL documentation is available upon request. 
 Nineteen officers were interviewed for this study. These officers came from different police 
departments throughout the greater Kansas City, Missouri, area. The police departments include 
Topeka, Lawrence, Leavenworth, Shawnee, Gladstone, North Kansas City, Overland Park, and Kansas 
City, Missouri. These departments were selected based on a combination of practical considerations as 
well as representation of the rural and urban jurisdictions that exist in this region. These departments, 
however, do provide some representative samples of the greater Kansas City area as well as 
characteristics shared in other jurisdictions. 
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 Table 4-1 provides some demographic information for each of these communities in addition to 
similar data for the United States as a whole. This information illustrates that the communities being 
analyzed for this study, while regionally uniform and not necessarily representative of the entire United 
States, do have similarities to the United States as a whole. In addition to these basic demographic 
similarities, the jurisdictions included in this study also encompass a number of other interesting 
characteristics: the Kansas City metropolitan area is a larger city; Kansas City, Missouri, has what may be 
considered attractive terrorist targets (professional sports teams, international airport, federal building, 
etc.); Overland Park, Shawnee, Gladstone, North Kansas City, and Leavenworth would all be considered 
suburbs of Kansas City, Missouri; Leavenworth has within its city limits the Army installation of Ft. 
Leavenworth, a Veterans Affairs Hospital, and a Federal Penitentiary; Lawrence, Kansas, is home to the 
University of Kansas (fall, 2010, enrollment of more than 26,000); and Topeka is the state capital of 
Kansas. Combined, these communities provide a diverse glimpse at numerous types of communities and 
these characteristics can be found in cities and states around the country. 
 The interviews were scheduled typically through a liaison from each department. These liaisons 
were generally accommodating regarding requests for interviews with street-level and command-level 
officers. Ultimately, however, the researcher was at the discretion of the department regarding which 
officers would be made available for interviews. As a result, the interviews may not have been 
representative of the entire police force. However, officers of varying positions and ranks were 
interviewed from a diverse cross-section of the greater Kansas City area. 
 The interviews typically lasted approximately 40 minutes (although they ranged from 30-90 
minutes) and were all digitally recorded (audio only) for accuracy. The questions discussed above and 
listed below served primarily as a guideline for each interview. The demographic and background 
questions were asked of every subject but other questions were only asked as needed. For example, 
some questions, such as “What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy?” prompted answers that covered 
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multiple questions. In these cases, clarification follow-on questions were sometimes asked. In addition, 
some responses prompted additional inquiry from the interviewer. These additional inquiries resulted 
from instances where unique questions were prompted by ideas presented by the subject. 
 Following the interviews, the researcher spent time analyzing the audio tapes. Each interview 
was reviewed and summarized in a standard form (see Appendix D). These summaries included general 
themes of the interview, basic demographic and/or background information, and specific quotes of 
note. The interviews are used to augment the survey data providing nuance and detail not captured by 
the relatively blunt survey tool. In addition, consistent themes found throughout the summaries are also 
utilized for more specific consideration throughout this study, especially where the survey data appears 
to be incomplete or incongruent with expectations. In these cases, interview data was instrumental in 
filling in the gaps and allowed for a broader understanding of the perspectives of local level law 
enforcement officers. 
Surveys: 
 As stated above, the original intent of this particular study was to just conduct interviews of 
police officers from Lawrence, Kansas, Kansas City, Missouri, and the University of Kansas. However, 
after being approved by the HSCL in November, the researcher found it difficult to make the contacts 
necessary to conduct these desired interviews. The researcher then determined that to help increase 
the amount of data available for this study it would be helpful to develop and administer a survey to as 
many officers in the greater Kansas City area as possible. The survey discussed here was, therefore, 
originally created simply to increase the amount of available data. 
 The survey questions, unlike interview questions, were more focused and less open ended. 
Interview questions can be open ended so as to increase contributions from the subject. Any lack of 
clarity can be addressed by the researcher during the interview. Surveys, on the other hand, involve the 
participant individually completing the interview with no opportunity for the researcher to follow up 
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with any additional questions. As a result, it was imperative that each survey question focus on one, and 
only one, topic so that the responses can be unequivocally tied to that particular concept. If more than 
one concept is covered in a particular question, it cannot be determined precisely which element of the 
question the participant is responding.  
 Different types of questions were designed to keep the survey at a manageable size. Multiple 
choice options, scales, and open-ended questions were included in the survey. The multiple choice 
questions were used for all demographic and background questions (such as age, years of experience, 
and gender). Substantive multiple choice questions were also included. The options provided for each 
multiple choice question differed depending on the topic covered in the question. For example, 
knowledge questions had options such as “I know all of the policy”, “I know most of the policy”, “I know 
some of the policy”, and “I know none of the policy”. These choices allow for respondents to more 
accurately describe their self-assessed level of knowledge compared to answering a question with either 
a “Yes” or “No” response. The scale questions, for example, allowed respondents to rate the threat of 
terrorism in their jurisdiction on a scale from 0-10 (with 0 being low and 10 being high). Finally, one 
open-ended question was included. This question gave the respondents the opportunity to provide 
additional information they felt important to include. These responses, however, were inconsistent and 
were used more for anecdotal and supplemental evidence in support of other data. Ultimately, the final 
survey was compiled of 34 questions. 
 To improve the clarity of the survey, a pilot version was administered to five individuals. All five 
are male, four are white and one is African-American. They range in age from 28-50 and have military 
connections ranging from current Colonel to civilian senior leader. Two have political science 
backgrounds. They all have bachelor’s degrees and either already have earned, or are working towards, 
graduate degrees. Finally, these individuals currently reside in either Lawrence, Kansas, or Leavenworth, 
Kansas. The feedback provided by these individuals ranged from basic identification of grammatical 
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errors to concerns about redundancy of the questions and topics that may have been left unasked in the 
original survey. This process took approximately one week to complete but was invaluable to creating a 
survey that would be more effective at providing relevant and meaningful data for this study. A copy of 
the distributed survey can be found in Appendix B. 
 Selecting departments to survey was done using a mass email campaign to the jurisdictions in 
the greater Kansas City area. The email communication was sent to the police chief’s address found on 
online websites for the various departments. The message stated the researcher’s name, profession, 
and academic pursuits in addition to the requested assistance of officers to respond to the survey. 
Electronic copies of the survey were also attached to the initial email message to allow the chiefs, or 
their subordinates, to evaluate more effectively whether or not they would be willing to participate in 
this study. Initially, the Lawrence, Shawnee, Gladstone, and North Kansas City departments responded 
favorably. Appointments were made by the researcher with liaisons from each department to visit and 
discuss the particulars of this research project. In these cases, copies of the survey were left with the 
liaison who then distributed them to officers within their respective departments. Arrangements were 
made to pick up these surveys after they had been completed. Leavenworth and Independence, 
Missouri, also responded to the mass email and completed surveys electronically, submitting them to 
the researcher via email. Overland Park, Kansas, responded in a more proactive manner than any of the 
other departments. The Police Chief of Overland Park requested a meeting with the researcher to 
discuss the intentions and needs of this particular study. After a brief meeting, the Overland Park Police 
Chief agreed to assist the researcher by uploading the survey into an online format to be distributed, at 
the specific request of the police chief, to all the major jurisdictions in the greater Kansas City area. In 
addition, surveys were also distributed by the Overland Park Police Department to other, “Benchmark” 
departments. 
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 The “Benchmark City Coalition” was formed in 1997 under the direction of the Overland Park 
Police Chief. Cities were selected based on one of two criteria: they were in the immediate Kansas City 
area or they were cities Overland Park competed with for business. Originally there were more than 20 
cities that were part of this coalition. However, this number has been trimmed to 15 cities due to self-
removal from the coalition or because the group deemed them to dissimilar. The original intent of this 
coalition was to find cities of comparable demographics and to share “best practices” information to 
help improve law enforcement efforts in all of the communities within the coalition (all information 
regarding the “Benchmark City Coalition” was provided by Officer Tallman from the Overland Park Police 
Department). The cities that are part of this coalition can be found all over the country and Table 4-2 
lists each of them and provides some basic information about population, violent crimes, and median 
income. The survey that Overland Park put online was sent to all of these cities in addition to the 
communities within the greater Kansas City area. This distribution increased the data available for study 
and provided for additional perspectives from around the country. However, one significant limitation 
occurred. The construction of the survey did not allow for the researcher to know the origin of each 
response. Although this is a limitation of this study, it should not interfere with the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 5 or with the conclusions reached in this study. 
 All survey responses were inputted into an Excel worksheet, whether automatically through the 
online program or by hand in the cases of those surveys received either in person or via email. The data 
was then converted into numerical values as needed. Each survey question was made a variable. For 
example, the first question about experience in law enforcement was labeled as the “YEARSEX’ variable. 
The codebook listing all of these variables and other pertinent information can be found in Appendix C. 
Analysis: 
 The surveys, after being imported into R, were manipulated to produce descriptive analysis and, 
in some cases, logistical regression was performed. The descriptive data proved to be useful for 
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providing answers to many of the research questions mentioned in Chapter 3. The logistic regressions 
allowed the researcher to make statements about predictions regarding responses to certain questions 
based on responses to other questions on the survey. The analysis of the data will be more explicitly 
described in Chapter 5. 
 The interview responses were not statistically analyzed. Rather, these responses provided detail 
and nuance to support or fill in gaps found in the survey data. For example, the surveys appeared to 
indicate that relatively few police officers know their department’s anti-terrorism policy; yet, the 
interviews illuminate that they may, in fact, know more than they realize. As with the analysis of the 
survey data, examination and interpretation of the interview data will be further examined in the next 
chapter. 
Conclusion: 
 This chapter has outlined the research design for this study. The rationale for conducting 
interviews and administering surveys was explored, the process and logic used in constructing all 
questions was explained in detail, and the process for selecting subjects was also described. Information 
about the communities and police departments chosen was provided and rationale for their inclusion 
was presented. The next chapter will analyze the data collected thereby more fully answering the 
questions posed in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 5: Results and Analysis 
 This chapter presents analysis and conclusions for several topics. Police officer knowledge of 
anti-terrorism policy and their interpretation of this policy are examined. The relationship between local 
police departments and federal agencies is scrutinized. This chapter analyzes whether or not local law 
enforcement is capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy. Officer perspectives regarding 
improvement of anti-terrorism implementation is offered. Finally, police opinions are juxtaposed to 
those of citizens of the United States. Survey and interview responses provide the data and impetus for 
reaching conclusions that create the foundation for answering the research question of this study: how 
do local law enforcement officers implement national anti-terrorism policy? 
Demographic information: 
 459 surveys were completed for this study. Many of the surveys were from communities in 
Eastern Kansas and Western Missouri. Additional surveys were completed by officers in communities 
from other parts of the country ranging from California to Virginia (see tables 4-1 and 4-2 for 
information about these communities).  
 Figure 5-2 graphically illustrates some basic demographic information of the survey 
respondents. Most of the respondents range in age from 26 to 50 years old; 419 are white; and 404 are 
male. The majority of these officers have been officers for more than 11 years (300 of 459) but most 
have fewer than 11 years experience at their current position (349 of 459). Finally, the majority of 
officers consider themselves to be a Republicans who ascribe to a conservative ideology. 
 White males are definitely over sampled in this study, but this is a function of the process for 
selecting these subjects. The researcher had little ability to select interview and survey subjects as was 
described in Chapter 4. This does not change the fact that the results from the survey and interviews 
may not necessarily be generalizable beyond the immediate scope of this study. Regardless, the results 
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do still have the ability to illuminate previously under-studied concepts regarding the role of local law 
enforcement in the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. 
 Table 5-1 provides some similar information about the nineteen interview subjects. Eighteen of 
these subjects are white; the average age is 46 ½ years old; and all were male. The average police 
experience was just more than 24 ½ years per subject. Fourteen consider themselves to be conservative 
and five consider themselves moderates.  
 In addition to the basic demographic information provided above, it is also useful to understand 
the role officers play in implementing anti-terrorism policy. The amount of experience officers have 
implementing anti-terrorism policy is an important characteristic for analysis of the various topics 
discussed in this chapter. This role can be measured in terms of the job an officer has within their 
department as well as the amount of time spent engaged in anti-terrorism activities.   
 Figure 5-2 and Table 5-5 display the role police officers believe they play in anti-terrorism 
efforts. The “Role in Preventing Terrorism” graph in Figure 5-2 shows that local law enforcement officers 
are divided on whether or not they have a role in preventing terrorism.  45.1% of officers believe that 
they are not directly involved in preventing terrorism while 41.8% believe the opposite. Yet, the amount 
of time spent on actual anti-terrorism activities per week and month seems to indicate that the 
respondents overwhelmingly do not have frequent cause to be engaged in terrorism prevention. The 
vast majority of officers claim to spend less than five hours per week on such activities (see Figure 5-2, 
“Time Spent on Anti-terror per Week”). Similarly, most officers do not engage in more than five anti-
terrorism activities per month. The amount of time spent on anti-terrorism efforts appears to contradict 
the role officers believe they have considering more than 40% of respondents identify their role as being 
directly related to preventing terrorism yet more than 90% of respondents claim to spend little or no 
time actually involved in anti-terrorism activities. This can logically be resolved, however, by simply 
recognizing that how much time is actually spent on preventing terrorism does not depend on how 
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officers define their role. Rather, officers can certainly believe that one of their primary responsibilities 
is to prevent terrorism while at the same time perceiving that they are not actually involved in anti-
terrorism activities with any significantly frequency. Later in this chapter, this perception of the will be 
more thoroughly examined. 
 The interview subjects were not explicitly asked these same questions. They were asked what 
their position within their department is and whether or not they have ever investigated any terrorist 
incident. Nine of the nineteen subjects hold, or held, positions that were directly involved in terrorism 
response and/or prevention. These positions range from Chief of Police to Terrorism Liaison Officer. 
Twelve of the nineteen subjects stated that they had, at least once in their careers, been directly 
involved in a terrorism investigation. The nature of these investigations ranged from a single submission 
of a suspicious activity intelligence report to daily analysis of intelligence gathered within their 
jurisdiction. The majority of these twelve respondents had limited experience with anti-terrorism 
investigations making it reasonable to assume that they would have responded on the survey in a 
manner consistent with those collected thus making their interview answers comparable to those 
surveyed. 
Do police officers know the national, state, and/or local anti-terrorism policy? 
 Before considering how police officers implement national anti-terrorism policy, it is useful to 
consider whether or not they actually know this policy. Of equal relevance is their knowledge of state 
and local anti-terrorism police. This knowledge serves as a baseline for understanding how officers 
perceive their role in this broader anti-terrorism effort. If police officers have knowledge of these 
policies, then that may indicate that they, or at least their departments, have made anti-terrorism 
implementation a priority. Failure to know these policies may suggest that these officers either do not 
see themselves as critical to the anti-terrorism effort or that their departments (or the other agencies) 
do not value their role in this regard. 
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 There are three questions on the survey that directly ask if respondents know the federal, state, 
and their department anti-terrorism policies. Table 5-2 shows the percentage of responses answering “I 
do not know the policy”, “I know some of the policy”, “I know most of the policy”, “I know all of the 
policy”, and “My department does not have a policy” (as applicable) and Figure 5-1 graphically compares 
the raw data for these variables. The overwhelming majority of respondents know little of the federal 
anti-terrorism policy. Similar responses can be seen regarding state policy. Knowledge of departmental 
anti-terrorism policy is more diverse but a majority of respondents still claim to not know or only know 
some of this policy. In addition, 17% of respondents claim that their department has no policy. 
Furthermore, most officers do not know whether or not their department’s anti-terrorism policy is 
similar to federal policy (see Figure 5-1, “Is department policy similar to federal policy?”). This result is 
logical considering most of the officers do not know the federal policy or their department’s policy. 
The survey results provide clear evidence that police officers are not knowledgeable of anti-
terrorism policy. The interviews provide a little different information. Interview subjects, when 
specifically asked what their department’s anti-terrorism policy is, generally claimed to not know what 
the policy is or stated that their department has no such policy. However, further questioning of these 
subjects provided evidence that these statements, and the survey results, are likely misleading. 
Only six of the nineteen officers interviewed stated that their department actually has an anti-
terrorism policy. One officer who indicated knowledge of his department’s policy admitted that “until 
that [the survey used for this study] came about, I did not know it. I had to look it up. And there is one, 
and it’s actually pretty thorough.” This, however, indicates a different sort of dilemma: department’s 
may, in fact, have a policy, but this policy is not fully understood by the officers. This, too, may not be an 
accurate description of officers’ understanding of such policies. 
Knowledge of a policy does not necessarily have to mean understanding of a written, official 
document that can be pulled off a shelf and held in hand. In fact, policies that are simply understood 
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and followed without necessitating a hard copy may actually be more meaningful. If an officer has to 
look up a particular policy every time he needs to act it can be problematic for obvious reasons. 
However, if an officer simply acts in accordance with some type of standard operating procedure, 
regardless of whether or not knowledge of written authorization to act in such a manner is present, 
these procedures are de facto policies of the department. The interviews indicate that this may be the 
case with anti-terrorism policy implementation. 
For example, one officer stated the following when asked about his department’s anti-terrorism 
policy:  
“The only function I had was to get up to speed with respect to that *terrorism+, to develop 
relationships within the region and with our federal partners, to become aware and to bring 
back the message, develop the capability to respond on the local level. And so, I think, while we 
may not necessarily have a written document that spells this policy out, it’s been very clear for 
the last eight, nine years now, that it is a high priority of the chief and of our local leaders to 
develop that knowledge base and that capability.” 
 
Another officer stated:  
“We’ve integrated ourselves into the national efforts, at least as best as we understand. We 
have dedicated resources to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, but, more importantly, we train, 
and we continue to train, in small ways, not in any great, grandiose plan or strategy, but efforts 
at trying to identify suspicious behaviors that might be terrorist-related.” 
 
These responses indicate what yet another officer described as an anti-terrorism “mindset”. The 
interviews indicate that this mindset involves a recognition that local police officers need to be 
observant of abnormal behavior and “not dismissing something as being completely benign.” In 
addition, every officer interviewed knew the procedures they should take if they encountered a 
terrorism incident: what immediate actions to take, what type of report to file, and who to contact with 
this information. It may be true that most of the officers surveyed do not know any anti-terrorism 
policy. But, as the interviews illustrate, not knowing a specific, written, official policy does not 
necessarily equate to a lack of understanding regarding how to handle a terrorist incident. 
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How do local police officers interpret anti-terrorism policy and what role do they believe they have in this 
national effort? 
 These two questions will be considered together because they are inextricably related to each 
other. An officer’s perspective of his role in combating terrorism is dependent on his interpretation of an 
anti-terrorism policy. If an officer does not believe that he is an integral part of anti-terrorism policy 
implementation, he will likely be interpreting the policy in a way that downplays the importance of local 
law enforcement officers. Conversely, a belief that local law enforcement is important in the 
implementation of anti-terrorism policy necessitates an interpretation of this policy that values the role 
of local police officers. 
 The belief of officers regarding the threat terrorism poses their respective communities is a 
concept that forms the foundation for this discussion. If officers believe that terrorism is a threat to their 
community, it is plausible to assume that they may have a different interpretation of anti-terrorism 
policy compared to those who do not believe terrorism is a threat to their community. It is also possible, 
however, that these beliefs are independent. Regardless, it is prudent to first consider how officers 
perceive the threat to their community before proceeding further. 
The survey specifically addresses this issue by allowing respondents to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10 
(0 being “Strongly disagree” and 10 being “Strongly agree”) whether or not they agree with the 
statement, “Terrorism is a threat within your community”. Figure 5-3 graphically represents the 
responses and Table 5-4 provide raw and percentage data of the results to this question. Interpreting 
the scale it seems reasonable to assume the following: selection of choices 0-3 indicate the respondent 
does not feel terrorism is much of a threat to their community; selection of choices 7-10 indicate the 
respondent feels that terrorism is a threat to their community; and selection of choices 4-6 indicate the 
respondent feels that terrorism is a moderate threat to their community. Based on this understanding of 
the scale, only 21.8% of respondents seem to feel that terrorism is not a threat to their community, 
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34.4% of respondents feel that there is a moderate threat, and 43.8% of respondents believe that 
terrorism is a relatively significant threat. If respondents who chose “6” on the scale are added to the 
“threat” categorization the percentage of those who believe that terrorism does pose a threat to their 
community rises to 53.6%. A conservative summary of this data clearly indicates that most of the 
respondents to the survey perceive terrorism as at least a moderate threat to their community. 
Twelve of the nineteen subjects interviewed for this study definitively stated that they believe 
terrorism poses a threat to their community. According to one officer, the threat is “significant”; 
another made the statement, “I don’t know why it hasn’t been played on before”; and yet another 
summed up this perspective with the following, “I believe it’s a huge threat”. One respondent was 
particularly poignant in stating the following: “There’s a threat to us. I can’t put a score or a value on it 
as compared to other folks, but Kansas City is in danger … I think that Kansas City is on someone’s 
radar.” 
A couple of the dissenters did not feel terrorism poses a threat in the traditional sense. Instead, 
these subjects assert that it “depends on how you define threat” as stated by one officer. “I think it’s a 
possibility that it could occur [terrorism attack], but I think that we are more likely the place where 
terrorists may live” is how one officer began his explanation of this definition. Another officer offered 
this additional explanation, “I think what we have in the Midwest, on the international side, are 
fundraising opportunities to finance international terrorism efforts.” An officer who admitted that 
terrorism poses a threat to his community did have this to offer this broader discussion about defining 
the threat: “Kansas City has fundraising, it has safe housing, it has training.” These perspectives add 
significantly to this discussion by suggesting that the threat posed by terrorism may not be imminent in 
these communities, but that terrorist activities may be occurring none-the-less. The implication of this 
conclusion is that officers may not believe their community is a target but that terrorism activities are 
still occurring within their jurisdictions. 
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 These differing perspectives regarding the threat of terrorism serve as the backdrop for more 
closely analyzing the questions in this section. Answers to these questions can be seen in several of the 
interview responses when officers were asked what role local law enforcement can or should have in 
this effort. One officer stated, “I don’t really think we fit into it *anti-terrorism efforts+ at all.” Another 
agreed with that sentiment, claiming, “I am below plankton. I have no authoritative role whatsoever, if 
they ask us to go do something, we just follow their orders. So, I am very, very low on the food chain.” 
On the other hand, several of the subjects hold a different perspective, such as an officer who said, “I 
think we can play a very large role. We play, in my opinion we play kind of the same role of what our 
citizens play for us; that is, the eyes and ears of a larger, coordinated response.” Yet another officer 
claimed that local police officers are “squarely on the front lines” of the effort to fight terrorism in the 
United States. This small sample of interview responses illustrates the ways an officer may interpret 
policy and, therefore, how they perceive their role implementing anti-terrorism policy. 
 The majority of interview respondents believed that local law enforcement has a role to play in 
fighting terrorism. However, this belief was generally expressed in terms of simply doing their jobs but 
being cognizant of potential connections to terrorism implications. One officer stated this perspective 
particularly succinctly: “Terrorism prevention is basically, in large part, just doing good law enforcement: 
paying attention, running people through the appropriate databases, documenting things, paying 
attention and not dismissing something as being completely benign.” 
 Figures 5-3 and 5-5 include graphs that illustrate responses from the survey that are relevant to 
the questions considered here. Asked to rank on a scale whether or not anti-terrorism efforts is a 
worthwhile endeavor for local law enforcement, respondents selected “10”, or “Strongly agree”, 116 
out of 459 times, more than any single other choice. 322 respondents (70.2%) chose 7-10 on the scale. 
These results indicate that more than two-thirds of all the respondents believe that implementing anti-
terrorism policy is an important responsibility for local police departments. 
39 
 
 Officers believe that there is at least a moderate threat of terrorism in their communities. 
Moreover, even officers who do not believe terrorism poses a threat to their community agree that 
other terrorism activities are likely occurring. There is also general consensus among officers that 
participating in anti-terrorism activities is a worthy activity. These beliefs lead to a natural next question, 
are local police departments doing everything they can to implement anti-terrorism policy? Figure 5-5 
(“Dept. does all it can” graph) indicates that most of the respondents either didn’t know (236) or believe 
their department is doing all it can to aid with the anti-terrorism effort (146). This result could provide 
some insight into whether or not officers view anti-terrorism policy implementation as important or not. 
But, it likely supports the idea that officers generally do not know their department’s policy. Considering 
this possibility has, at the very least, been qualified based on interview responses, it is most likely that 
the “Don’t know” responses inadequately represent the views of officers. However, the fact that, 
despite the inclination of respondents to claim ignorance of departmental policy, nearly one-third of all 
officers believe that their department is doing all it can to support anti-terrorism policy provides 
evidence that they also believe that it is an important function for local law enforcement. It is also 
possible that officers who do not believe this is a job of local law enforcement may believe that their 
department is doing little and that that is precisely what they should be doing. The interviews, as 
described above, provide evidence that this is the less likely perspective. Another conclusion to reach 
based on these findings is that officers really don’t know how their departments are involved in 
preventing terrorism.  
 Further support for the conclusions reached above is provided when analyzing the beliefs of 
officers regarding usage of department resources. Figure 5-5 (“Good use of resource” graph) shows that 
most officers believe that using department resources for anti-terrorism efforts is worthwhile. 58.6% of 
all respondents (269 out of 459) answered that they “Agree” that taking steps to prevent terrorism is a 
good use of departmental resources. Those who responded with “Agree” and “Strongly agree” totaled 
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333, or 72.5% of all responses. This result confirms the statement that police officers believe they are 
important to preventing terrorism and that they are the “front line of defense” when it comes to this 
national security effort. 
What is the relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement regarding anti-
terrorism policy implementation? 
 The relationship between local law enforcement and federal anti-terrorism agencies is another 
component of policy implementation. Figure 5-4 illustrates the responses from survey respondents on 
this issue and Table 5-3 provides percentage data. The “Good relationship w/feds” graph illustrates what 
the raw data indicates: the majority of officers surveyed do not know whether or not their department 
has a good relationship with the federal government (273 of 459, 59.5%). 21.6% (99 out of 459) of 
respondents did “Agree” or “Strongly agree” with the assertion that there exists a good relationship 
with the federal government while 19.0% (87 out of 459) responded with selections of “Disagree” or 
“Strongly disagree”. This variable indicates that it is likely that line-officers may not have much 
interaction with federal agencies, particularly when it comes to anti-terrorism investigations. 
 This assessment may be correct but it is also possible that it is overly simplistic. Officer opinions 
on how well federal policy is communicated to their departments and how much intelligence these local 
departments receive from the federal government are other measures of this relationship. The 
perceived quality and effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy is also a valuable indicator of the 
nature of the association between local and national agencies. The belief by police officers that federal 
agencies are effective in their anti-terrorism efforts likely corresponds with a relatively strong 
relationship between the local law enforcement and federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS. Finally, 
the strength of this partnership can be evaluated based on how well federal policy has aided local police 
departments with their anti-terrorism efforts. 
41 
 
 Looking at Figure 5-4 and Table 5-3 several aspects of the relationship between local 
departments and federal agencies are interesting. The majority of officers clearly claim that they “Don’t 
know” whether or not federal policy has helped their departments prevent terrorism. This result adds 
credence to the suggestion that officers really do not have much interaction with the federal 
government on matters of terrorism prevention. However, other responses seem to indicate that this 
assertion is not entirely accurate. 
According to Table 5-3, 36.7% of respondents believe that federal anti-terrorism policy is 
effective and 37.3% believe that intelligence is shared with their departments in a timely manner by 
federal agencies. These findings indicate a greater amount of knowledge of the relationship their 
department has with the federal government on matters of terrorism than the previously discussed 
topics would indicate. However, the table still shows that more than 40% of respondents, in both cases, 
still claim that they “Don’t know” whether or not the federal government and their department are 
cooperating.  
More interesting are opinions regarding how well the federal government has communicated 
their policy to local departments and how well they have been prepared by federal agencies to 
implement this policy. Nearly the same percentage of respondents claimed that the federal government 
has not done a good job of preparing their department (38.9%, 178 out of 458) as those claiming 
ignorance (39.5%, 181 out of 458). Additionally, 42.4% of officers do not believe that federal anti-
terrorism policy has been well communicated to their departments. These results have several 
meaningful implications: (1) some of the officers surveyed seem to be implying that they believe the 
federal government could be doing more to prepare their departments; (2) similar to number one, there 
appears to be some dissatisfaction with relationship between the federal government and their 
department; (3) these officers also seem to be indicating that they believe that implementing this policy 
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is important at the local level; and (4) more of the officers appear to be knowledgeable of the 
relationship between the federal government and their department than other variables indicate.  
The findings described above seem to show inconsistent and contradictory opinions. However, 
acknowledging that the federal government is doing an effective job of preventing terrorism does not 
necessarily mean that they are doing well working with local departments for this same purpose. 
Similarly, receiving intelligence from the federal government does not necessarily equate to a positive 
relationship between local and national agencies. It is possible that respondents differentiated between 
receiving intelligence reports from the federal government and having an overall constructive 
relationship with them. Regardless of this complexity, these results provide support for the fourth 
conclusion reached above postulating that local police officers are more knowledgeable of this 
relationship than the more direct survey question responses indicate. 
 All of the interview subjects indicated at least some level of knowledge of the relationship 
between the federal government and their department. In addition, they also all acknowledged that this 
relationship has, at least in terms of information sharing, improved since the events of September 11, 
2001. However, the opinions diverge on other relationship matters.  
 Several of the subjects emphatically claimed that there is a positive and strong relationship 
between their department and federal agencies. One command-level officer stated: 
“We’re getting far more bang for our buck, we’re getting better outcomes when it comes to 
putting people in custody and those sorts of things. Very professional organizations we’ve dealt 
with: the FBI, the attorney’s office, the ATF, and the DEA, those are the people we probably deal 
with the most.”  
 
A police chief added, “The message came down loud-and-clear to the Bureau that the one-way door of 
information could not continue because it had disastrous consequences. I think, for the most part, 
they’re *the FBI+ really trying to change that culture.” And still one more command-level officer offered 
the following perspective:  
43 
 
“I would have to say that the focus now on information sharing is a dramatically different animal 
from the 1970’s ‘till now. Where before the FBI was known as an agency that you briefed but 
never got back anything, now it’s a two-way street and now, from time-to-time, they’re calling 
us to do things that before they would either not have accomplished or done themselves.” 
 
 Other interviewed officers, however, had a different perspective. “The FBI is hard to work with,” 
stated one officer. Another claimed, “I don’t know what the Department of Homeland Security is doing 
in [his community+, if anything. I just don’t.” Yet another added, “We’re somebody they *the FBI+ have to 
deal with. Deep down inside the agencies you’re going to find personnel there that say, ‘I don’t want to 
deal with them.’” A patrol officer said, “It’s been my experience, with few exceptions, that the federal 
government will come in and when they need something they’ll be nice to you and let you play and then 
off they go and take the credit for everything.” And one more asserted the following: 
“I would describe it *relationship with federal agencies] as adequate. I think the relationship 
could be strengthened just through what we’re talking about here: having a more stable, 
specific program in place for local police departments that obviously does not exist now.” 
 
 It is worth noting, again, that every subject interviewed at least conceded that the relationship 
between federal agencies (such as the FBI and DHS) and their departments is better now than it was 
prior to September 11, 2001. Equally relevant, however, is the fact that all of the officers interviewed 
also stated that more progress needs to be made to improve this relationship. It is also important to 
recognize some differences between the officers quoted above: (1) the majority of those who made 
predominantly positive remarks were in positions where they were privy to more terrorism-relevant 
information (such as police chiefs and specific anti-terrorism positions); and (2) the majority of those 
holding more negative opinions on this subject were line, or patrol, officers and less likely to be directly 
involved in terrorism investigations. Regardless of these differences, however, all of those interviewed 
were familiar with their department’s relationship with federal agencies on matters of terrorism, clearly 
in opposition to the findings of topics discussed in this section. This is significant because it indicates 
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that the survey questions directly applicable to this issue may not have adequately captured the true 
opinions of the participating officers. 
 Considering all of the data collected, both from the survey and from the interviews, some 
conclusions can be reached. First, officers likely are aware of this relationship. Second, information 
sharing, specifically, is improving and is the most noticeable manifestation of this relationship. Third, this 
relationship has improved over time. Finally, there is considerable work left to be done to strengthen 
this relationship.  
This final conclusion bleeds into other topics already covered in this chapter as it depends on 
officers believing that preventing terrorism should be a function of local law enforcement. These two 
beliefs, police departments have an important role to fill in this effort and that the relationship between 
the federal government and local departments needs to improve, indicate that police officers likely 
believe they have more to offer this national effort than simple reporting of suspicious activities. It 
appears that they believe they can be better utilized in conducting investigations of suspected terrorist 
activity. These conclusions are certainly inconclusive but do, based on the data gathered, appear 
plausible and therefore worthy of attention. 
Are local police departments capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy? 
 To answer this question, it is important to consider the resources available to departments and 
how implementing anti-terrorism policy may impact their ability to carry out other duties. These 
questions help to determine if local police officers are actually able to implement anti-terrorism policy. 
Failure to have the proper resources will obviously make it difficult to prevent terrorism. Balancing anti-
terrorism efforts with other duties is equally necessary. These other duties involve investigating other 
crimes as well as interacting with the community. If implementing anti-terrorism policy interferes with 
these tasks then the ability of local policy to carry out all of their responsibilities, to include fighting 
terrorism, is compromised. 
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 Table 5-6 offers an initial analysis of this issue. The results show that 69.2% of respondents 
believe that federal policy does not prevent them from investigating other crimes and 74.9% believe 
that federal policy prevents them from completing other tasks. Clearly, the vast majority of officers do 
not believe that federal anti-terrorism policy interferes with their ability to carry out their other duties. 
These results are consistent with the findings for how much time officers spend engaged in anti-
terrorism activities per week and month. Most of the respondents do not actively engage in preventing 
terrorism weekly or monthly, therefore, it seems unlikely that their limited anti-terrorism activities 
would prohibit them from attending to other responsibilities. These results imply that officers could 
devote more time to anti-terrorism activities considering how little impact terrorism prevention appears 
to have on the execution of their jobs. It should also be noted that any increase in anti-terrorism efforts 
would invariably require compromise regarding allocation of officer time. Therefore, if local officers 
were required to be more actively engaged in terrorism prevention their beliefs on how such efforts 
impact their ability to carry out other job-related functions. 
 Opinions regarding how cost effective anti-terrorism efforts are coupled with perspectives on 
resource allocation reveal insight into how capable a department is to prevent terrorism. Belief that 
anti-terrorism efforts are cost effective clearly implies that the officer feels that her department has the 
financial ability to engage in anti-terrorism implementation. Additionally, if an officer believes that 
preventing terrorism is a worthwhile use of department resources it is logical to assume that she 
believes they have the resources available to engage in such activities. Figure 5-5 and Table 5-7 show 
the opinions of police officers regarding these issues. The surveyed officers are unsure as to whether or 
not anti-terrorism efforts are cost effective as 352 out of 457 respondents chose the “Don’t know” 
option. This finding is consistent with other results indicating officers lack knowledge of their 
department’s anti-terrorism policy. Officers who do not know their department’s policy likely do not 
know how costs are allocated for anti-terrorism efforts. It is also possible that most of the officers 
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surveyed actually have little knowledge of the budget for their respective departments therefore making 
it difficult for them to answer questions about cost effectiveness satisfactorily. Despite the possibility 
that participating officers are not well informed regarding costs associated with anti-terrorism policy 
implementation, the majority appear to feel that such efforts are worthwhile (72.5%, 333 out of 459 
responses selected “Agree” or “Strongly agree”). These findings make it difficult to provide a definitive 
answer to the question as to whether or not local police departments have the capability to implement 
anti-terrorism policy. Having such a capability necessitates financial resources and the respondents 
appear to be largely ignorant of whether or not their departments have such resources available. 
However, these officers seem to feel that devoting resources to anti-terrorism efforts is worthwhile. This 
conclusion is not directly supported by the data but the implication seems reasonable. 
 The subject of resource availability was only mentioned in a handful of the interviews. Generally 
speaking, the subjects who addressed this issue seemed to believe that the resources were present to 
help them respond to terrorism incidents. This is distinctly different from preventing terrorism, but most 
of the interview subjects seemed to categorize any and all anti-terrorism activities similarly when 
discussing resource allocation. Regardless of this distinction, when the topic of resources was 
mentioned, none of the interview respondents indicated that it was a cause of any concern. 
 Finally, the impact of anti-terrorism policy implementation on community-police relations is 
needs to be considered. Results seen in Table 5-8 clearly illustrate that the majority (71.2%) of all 
respondents agree that anti-terrorism policy has not interfered with their ability to perform their other 
duties. Conclusions reached for the other variables analyzed in this section can also be applied to this 
variable. There is one additional possibility that should be accounted for: officers believe that 
implementing anti-terrorism policy is part of their law enforcement duties.  
 This conclusion is supported by some of the interview responses as they indicate that preventing 
acts of terror is simply another responsibility. For example, one officer stated that “most police officers 
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do not consider themselves to be agents of national security. But, the fact is that we all have to be”. 
Another subject believes that,  
“Police officers in the United States are the first line of defense against domestic terrorism or 
international terrorism. That is a true statement. But these officers of law enforcement agencies 
… don’t necessarily wake up every morning saying, ‘how am I going to prevent terrorism today 
in my jurisdiction.’ That’s not where their daily activities take them.”  
 
Yet a different officer described the job of local law enforcement in terms of intelligence gathering, 
regardless of the situation: “Police officers are about building relationships and being able to gather 
intelligence information, whether it be about little Johnny who broke the window on the block or it it’s 
going to be about the guy who’s selling dope the next street over or the house down the street”. 
Perhaps this quote best expresses the sentiment regarding how police officers view anti-terrorism policy 
implementation: “Terrorism prevention is basically, in large part, just doing good law enforcement.” 
What all of these quotes imply is that most police officers do have a role to play in preventing terrorism 
but that it does not necessarily involve changing their behaviors too dramatically; rather, if means they 
just have to be aware of this additional responsibility. This change in mindset does not mean that 
officers necessarily believe anti-terrorism policy implementation has interfered with their ability to 
execute job-related duties. Instead, it is highly plausible that police officers simply believe it is part of 
their duties and therefore cannot interfere with law enforcement efforts. This also may help to explain 
why the interview subjects did not specifically reference terrorism prevention when discussing the 
availability of resources: if officers believe that preventing terrorism is “just doing good law 
enforcement,” then it is probable that they don’t feel there are any resources that need to be 
specifically allocated to this effort. 
 The impact of terrorism prevention efforts on citizen-police relations is a crucial aspect of anti-
terrorism policy implementation. Figure 5-6 and Table 5-9 provide graphic and numeric results 
illustrating the beliefs of police officers regarding this sensitive issue. Nearly 65% of all respondents do 
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not believe that anti-terrorism efforts have had a negative impact on their relationship with the 
community. Looking back at the discussion of how much time officers spend on terrorism prevention, 
this seems like a logical outcome given that few officers claim to participate in anti-terrorism activities 
with significant frequency. Limited anti-terrorism activity makes it difficult for such activities to 
negatively impact police-community relationships. 
 It is typical for people to consider the relationship between police officers and the community 
they serve in a one-way manner: police officers are the only ones to have an impact. Survey respondents 
were asked to consider how helpful the community has been in preventing terrorism thereby looking at 
the relationship as a two-way street where the community does have an effect on this national anti-
terrorism effort. Results can be seen in Figure 5-6 and Table 5-10 and show that the majority of 
respondents selected 4-6 which corresponds to having no strong opinion. What is notable, however, is 
the relatively low percentage (17.3%) of respondents who selected 7-10. Conservatively speaking, this 
result allows for the interpretation that police officers generally do not believe that the community has 
been helpful in preventing terrorism. A closer look at the data for selections 9 and 10 only supports this 
assertion as only 8 out of 457 respondents selected either of these options. Clearly very few survey 
participants believe strongly that their community has been helpful in preventing terrorism. 
 The general sentiment of the interview subjects is that citizens are important to preventing 
terrorism. Some subjects described this in terms of balancing civil liberties with security and how it is 
necessary to have an understanding public: “You have to not take extreme measures, but you have to 
take effective measures and sometimes that means when you collect information, for the good of all, 
you may violate or intrude on someone’s personal rights … when it comes to terrorism, I believe the 
good of all should be what we’re all interested in, to protect our country and our way of life. So if we 
have to inadvertently intrude on some people’s personal rights, I think that’s a small price to pay.” And 
other subjects focused on how citizens can actively assist law enforcement in preventing terrorism: “It’s 
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my theory that it’s not local law enforcement that’s important, it’s the garbage man, the postal worker, 
it’s the people who are delivering the papers at 5 o’clock in the morning: see something out of whack, 
report it, and all of a sudden, cascade effect. How we understand our community is more important 
than anything.” Regardless of the specific perspective, the interviews illuminate the importance to local 
law enforcement that community assistance can play in preventing terrorism. Whether relinquishing 
some freedoms or reporting suspicious activities, police officers appear to believe that community 
involvement is important to successful prosecution of the war on terror and the survey results indicate 
the belief of officers that the community is not fulfilling this potential role.  
 Determining anti-terrorism capabilities of a police department is not as simple as looking at a 
budget or balance sheet. The variables considered in this section demonstrate how other factors must 
also be considered. Obviously, having the resources available and the willingness to deploy them in 
efforts designed to prevent or respond to terrorism is essential and the data presented here indicates 
that officers believe this is reasonable. But, it is also important to consider how anti-terrorism efforts 
may detract from other police duties and the relationship departments have with their communities 
with regards to this effort. If anti-terrorism efforts take away from other responsibilities or if the 
community is resistant to implementing these policies, can it truly be said that the department is 
capable of effectively implementing this policy? The ability of a police department to integrate anti-
terrorism needs with other responsibilities and to foster a positive community support network is 
important to preventing acts of terror.  
The data presented here does not conclusively answer this research question. Insight is offered 
into how officers perceive their department’s ability to implement anti-terrorism policy. Generally 
speaking, officers appear to be confident that terrorism prevention activities do not interfere with their 
other responsibilities. In fact, it appears they view anti-terrorism efforts as just being part of good 
policing. It also seems that officers believe the resources are available to respond to terrorism events 
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and that the application of these resources to anti-terrorism measures is worthwhile. Police officers also 
seem to feel that the local community is important in this effort, but that citizens are not necessarily 
doing everything they can to help. Taking all of these results together, it seems fair to say that local law 
enforcement agencies are capable of implementing anti-terrorism policy, even if they are only able to do 
so imperfectly. 
What is the way forward? 
 This question, in one form or another, was posed to both the survey respondents and interview 
subjects. Survey respondents were allowed space to offer their own thoughts on anti-terrorism policy 
implementation in the form of an open-ended question. Interview subjects were specifically asked what 
changes they would make at the federal, state, and local level regarding anti-terrorism policy. Responses 
in both cases provide some insight into how officers see improvement occurring in the future regarding 
anti-terrorism policy. There may not be any numerical data, but there is plenty of information to 
consider. 
 51 out of 459 (11.1%) survey respondents included comments and these responses ranged from 
“no policy” to more detailed thoughts and ideas concerning the current and future state of affairs for 
local law enforcement regarding anti-terrorism policy implementation. Numerous ideas were mentioned 
in response to this question, but four main concepts repeatedly appeared: (1) the borders of the United 
States need to be secured; (2) there needs to be greater information sharing between the federal 
government and local law enforcement; (3) there needs to be greater emphasis and training at the local 
level; and (4) eliminate the politics from anti-terrorism efforts. These themes are echoed in the 
interview responses as well, with one noticeable contradiction: one interview subject specifically stated 
that border security and anti-terrorism policy are not related. 
 Some examples of responses from the surveys and interviews discussing these themes are as 
follows: One officer wrote, “Policy is not as much the problem as is the lack of information sharing by 
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the federal government.” Another agreed saying, “Until you close the border, any federal efforts at 
preventing terrorism is *sic+ an absolute laughable joke.” One more line-officer succinctly state, “We 
must control our borders.” A different suggestion was offered by an officer who works directly on 
homeland security issues, “I hope to see more training and awareness programs set in place in the near 
future.” A police chief offered, “You need to eliminate the political components that slow us down.” And 
a patrol officer concurred, saying, “In an ideal world, utopia if you will, all politics would be eliminated 
from the war on terrorism.” An officer who also works directly on analyzing terrorism-related leads 
offered an intriguing opinion, stating, “Intelligence should drive our actions … there needs to be better 
intelligence sharing and with better intelligence gathering and sharing we’ll be able to prevent more 
things from occurring.”  
 Clearly, officers do have opinions about how to proceed in preventing terrorism in the United 
States. Two of the four dominant themes (number 2 and number 3) indicate local level police officers 
believe they could be better utilized in preventing terrorism. The comments about information sharing 
emphasized that the federal government needs to share more information with local police officers 
because these officers are in a position to make an impact. One survey response directly addressed this 
issue in a succinct and cognizant manner:  
“Federal policy is, for the most part, driven from the top down. This means local implementation 
of federal policy will always fall short. Anti-terrorism policy driven from the local level up will 
likely be more effective since it will be better tailored to the metropolitan or regional area it is 
derived from. Policy derived in this manner will balance local with federal needs. When anti-
terrorism efforts are integrated into progressive community-oriented policing efforts and 
criminal investigations the results will become more effective.”  
 
This particular comment brings together several concepts discussed throughout this chapter: local law 
enforcement has a role to play in preventing terrorism; information sharing needs to be improved; and 
good policing tactics and techniques allows for effective incorporation of terrorism prevention into 
everyday officer activities. 
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Public opinion compared to officer opinion: 
 This study has revealed the opinions of some officers regarding various anti-terrorism policy 
implementation issues. It may be interesting, though, to compare these findings to that of the general 
public. It is likely that police officers will hold different opinions regarding the issues covered in the 
survey and interviews of this study compared to the public at large but it is worth examining to ensure 
that this assumption is accurate. Additionally, where public opinion and officer opinion is similar may 
actually be of greater interest and relevance: if both the public and police officers agree that changes 
need to be made, for example, then it provides credibility to this suggestion and perhaps warrants 
greater attention from anti-terrorism policy makers. Equally important is the consideration that police 
officers are “employees” of the public and if these officers have drastically different views than the 
public at large it may be a concern worthy of closer scrutiny. As anti-terrorism policy evolves, it is 
inevitable that public opinion will play a role in the budgetary and doctrinal decision making process. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to at least consider these opinions when discussing the role of local law 
enforcement in this effort. 
 Gallup poll data was used for the public opinion piece of this analysis. Seven poll questions were 
considered and Table 5-12 lists information about these questions including the most recent year the 
question was asked, the question itself, and the response options for each question. Table 5-11 shows 
responses from the officer survey for select topics as well as responses from the relevant Gallup polling 
questions. 
 Questions concerning the threat of terrorism were asked of both groups. Police officers were 
asked to rate, on a scale of 0-10 (0 being “Strongly disagree” and 10 being “Strongly agree”), whether or 
not they agreed that terrorism poses a threat to their community and 43.8% of these officers selected 7-
10. Similar questions were asked of the populace by Gallup in three different questions. These questions 
had results of 42%, 45% and 36% believing there was a threat of an attack to a family member or in the 
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near future. Comparing the officer and public responses indicates similarity between them therefore 
making it reasonable to conclude that police officers are indicative of the public regarding their 
perception of the threat. However, it is important to note that the officer survey was conducted in 2011 
while the Gallup surveys were conducted in 2010, 2005, and 2004. Therefore, it is possible that public 
opinion may not currently be consistent with the results reported here. Poll results regarding the level of 
worry respondents have that a family member will be a victim of terrorism have remained relatively 
constant over time ranging from 28% to 47% since 2004. For this reason, it is probable to expect that 
these results would be similar today thereby supporting the conclusion that the officers surveyed are 
indicative of the general public regarding their perception of the threat. 
 Interview data provides a slightly different perspective. The majority of the subjects interviewed 
for this survey did not believe that there was a particularly great threat to their specific community, but 
several stated that “it isn’t a matter of if, it’s a matter of when” another terrorist attack will occur and 
others expressed similar sentiments. This implies that the officer survey data may be somewhat 
misleading. A more accurate interpretation of the data collected, based on survey and interview data, 
may be to state that only 43.8% of officers surveyed believe terrorism is a likely threat to their 
community, but they do believe that a terrorist attack will occur in the future. This conclusion, while not 
definitive, may indicate that the officers interviewed and surveyed believe that terrorism is a greater 
threat to the United States than other citizens. One officer articulated this opinion relatively succinctly 
when asked whether or not terrorism is a threat within his community:  
“We think that it is and it falls in that category of not if, but when. Primarily, it falls in that 
category of we know terrorists are on our shores, it’s arrived in other locations in our nations, 
and we think that there is significance still remaining in the terrorist camps to strike the 
heartland and we consider ourselves to be very much a part of the heartland so we think that it 
falls into that category of it’s going to happen, but when?” 
 
 The Gallup poll question asking respondents where they believe terrorists are likely to attack in 
the future does not directly correlate to a survey question asked of officers. Rather, there were 
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interview responses that provide insight on the perspectives of police officers regarding this issue. 
Interestingly, 67% of respondents replied that they believed smaller communities were more likely to be 
targeted by terrorists. Numerous interviewees concurred with this belief, as illustrated in the quote 
above. While many interview respondents did not all believe that their community was a likely target, 
they concurrently believed that it was only a matter of time before terrorists launched attacks on malls, 
sporting events, or other similar targets that are in atypical locations.  
 A final category of data for comparison concerns the effectiveness of the government in 
preventing terrorism. The Gallup polls asked several variations of this question that correspond with 
survey questions asked of officers for this study. Generally, as shown in Table 5-11, the public seems 
satisfied with how well the government is doing protecting them from terrorism. The officers surveyed, 
on the other hand, seem less convinced. 
What is of interest, and seemingly a bit contradictory, is the result for the Gallup poll question 
about making changes to federal agencies responsible for protecting the United States from terrorism. 
This question asks respondents if they believe changes are needed and 63% believe that either a 
complete overhaul is necessary or major changes are needed. The reason this result seems to be 
contradictory is because satisfaction with government efforts should logically imply that respondents 
believe the agencies charged with protecting them from terrorism are operating at least satisfactorily 
and not in need of significant changes. This result is consistent with the beliefs of police officers. No 
question was specifically asked on the survey that mirrors this poll variable, but officers were asked if 
they believe federal government is effective in its anti-terrorism efforts. Additionally, they were asked 
about how well federal agencies help local departments prevent terrorism as well as how well their 
individual departments are doing with this implementation. Table 5-11 shows that officers do not seem 
to believe that federal anti-terrorism policy is especially effective. Police officers also do not seem to 
believe they have a strong relationship with the federal government. Additionally, the results show that 
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only 35.3% of respondents believe that their department is doing all that it can to prevent terrorism but 
that more than 70% of officers believe that preventing terrorism should be a responsibility of local law 
enforcement. Analyzed together, it is reasonable to conclude that officers believe that terrorism 
prevention efforts could be improved and at least one way it could be improved is through greater local 
level involvement. As described in other sections of this chapter, the interviews support this conclusion. 
Therefore, it is probably accurate to state that both the public and police officers believe that the way 
the United States attempts to prevent terrorism is in need of change and greater local law enforcement 
involvement with this effort is at least one preferred method of improvement. 
This conclusions reached in this section are in need of additional research. The same questions 
were not specifically asked of the police officers, the Gallup survey data, in many cases, is dated, and the 
police officers surveyed may not be representative of officers across the country. Despite these 
shortcomings, these results are still provocative and imply that work still needs to be done to improve 
the way in which the United States fights terrorism domestically. It may be wise for decision makers to 
examine this type of data, conduct further research, and consider the possibility of giving local law 
enforcement a more significant role in the anti-terrorism effort. 
General Discussion: 
 This chapter has provided evidence that local law enforcement officers believe that they are in a 
position to aid with the national anti-terrorism effort. Many officers believe there is a threat of terrorism 
within their communities, they see prevention of terrorism as a role they can fill, and they believe the 
capabilities exist for them to successfully undertake this additional responsibility. These conclusions are 
certainly not conclusive, but are representative of the results found in survey and interview responses.  
 These conclusions also imply that local law enforcement officers believe that they currently are 
underutilized in this effort against terrorism. In fact, Interview responses as well as survey comments 
explicitly state this position. The results of the survey also point to the accuracy of this implication, 
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particularly when one compares how much time officers engage in anti-terrorism activities to the beliefs 
expressed regarding the role they could play. The majority of officers claim they seldom engage in anti-
terrorism activities yet they overwhelmingly believe it is something worth doing at the local level. This 
augments some of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 promoting the idea of greater local level law 
enforcement in anti-terrorism efforts. Particularly, this chapter has provided some evidence that 
Docobo’s (2005) assertion that community policing would be an effective strategy may have validity, at 
least within the minds of police officers. As seen in numerous quotes throughout this chapter, at least 
some local law enforcement officers share this belief. To most of them the key is intelligence gathering 
and intelligence-based actions. Developing positive relationships within a pro-active citizenry is essential 
to gathering intelligence and then sharing this information with all relevant parties will help facilitate 
this type of behavior. These concepts fit in with many of the comments and data examined within this 
chapter and appears to be an area for both future research by academics and for analysis and 
consideration within the domestic anti-terrorism community. 
  The findings of this study are provocative and informative, yet the question remains regarding 
the generalizability of the conclusions reached in this chapter. This study is limited in this regard 
primarily because of the pool of participating officers in both the surveys and interviews. One officer, 
when asked why he believed his department had such a good working relationship with other law 
enforcement agencies in the greater Kansas City area (including other police departments as well as 
state and federal agencies) responded, simply, with “Midwest values.” It may be difficult to determine 
how “Midwest values” differ from those of other regions of the United States. However, the survey was 
administered to officers from other regions of the country ranging from Washington to Florida which 
may help mitigate this difference.  
 The next chapter will apply the findings described in this chapter to the broader research 
question of how local law enforcement implements national anti-terrorism policy. This will be 
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accomplished by connecting the results and conclusions reached here with previous literature and 
theory. These connections will reveal the significance of this study within the field of political science as 
well as provide practical applications for those charged with defending the United States from terrorism.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 The findings of the survey and interviews imply that local law enforcement serves a vital role in 
implementing national anti-terrorism policy. However, these police officers often are unaware of their 
importance. This chapter will expand on the role of police officers implementing this specific national 
security policy. Additionally, implications for theory, policy, and future research will be proposed. 
How are police officers implementing national anti-terrorism policy? 
 The results presented in Chapter 5 indicate that police officers have a critical role to play in the 
implementation of anti-terrorism policy but they are being underutilized in this capacity. Line officers 
generally do not see themselves as being actively involved in anti-terrorism efforts. However, their 
supervisors and other officers who are assigned to matters of homeland security tell a different story. 
These officers generally stated that the information provided them from the “front line” are integral to 
successful implementation of anti-terrorism policy. Therefore, police officers implement this policy 
through diligent police work. Their daily attention to detail, particularly the details that are out of the 
ordinary, provides the leads and intelligence necessary to build terrorism investigations. 
 The ability to carry out this mission, however, depends on other conditions being present. First, 
as confirmed by the interview and survey responses, officers must be adequately trained. This training 
needs to prepare the officers for the possible terrorist activities they may encounter. As intimated by 
several police chiefs, simply preparing for bomb threats and hijackings do not help officers prevent 
terrorism before it occurs. Instead, officers need to have training that helps them identify suspicious 
terrorist activity. 
 A second condition that must be met by officers to be effective in anti-terrorism is a clear 
understanding of their role. If officers do not recognize their importance to implementing anti-terrorism 
policy then they are less likely to actively engage in the necessary intelligence gathering. This failure 
would be extremely detrimental to all domestic anti-terrorism efforts. 
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 Third, there must be a reporting system in place that is both effective and well understood by 
local law enforcement. The interviews, in particular, as well as the survey responses indicated that 
police officers are aware of the fusion centers and the JTTF’s. In addition, most of the officers are aware 
of suspicious activity reports, how to file them, and how they are utilized by analysts. This condition can 
be achieved through training since it is essential for officers to have a thorough understanding of the 
agencies and reporting mechanisms in place to assist with terrorism investigations. 
 Finally, in order to best capitalize on their positions as the “boots on the ground” for this anti-
terrorism effort, local police officers need to be aware of suspicious activities within their communities. 
The results of this study tell a conflicting story regarding whether this condition is met. While most 
officers believe there is some sharing of this type of information with local law enforcement, they also 
believe that it is inadequate. Many officers are of the opinion that information does not necessarily get 
to those officers who are best equipped to act on it, nor is it always received in a timely fashion. This 
timely information would be useful to local officers as they try to focus their intelligence gathering 
efforts. 
Implications for policy: 
 The surveys and interviews provide a variety of perspectives of the officers and suggest some 
ideas for improvement of anti-terrorism policy implementation. Virtually every officer interviewed 
stated that their involvement in terrorism prevention has improved since September 11, 2001, but 
improvements are still needed. Additionally, as seen in Table 5-11, public opinion is also in favor of 
having changes made to government agencies responsible for protecting them from terrorism. 
Therefore, possible modifications to this policy and its implementation appear to be justified.  
 Improving information sharing was a common theme articulated by survey and interview 
respondents. One police chief and another officer working specifically on homeland security issues 
specifically mentioned intelligence-based policing as a means of effectively integrating local police 
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officers into the anti-terrorism effort. In this system, officer actions are based solely on the most recent 
intelligence.  For example, if credible information indicates there is a terrorist cell that is planning to 
purchase large quantities of explosives, the police would act on this intelligence and plan an operation 
to intercede and prevent this acquisition. Essential to this concept of policing, however, is accurate and 
timely information. If officers are routinely receiving false intelligence reports, the process breaks down 
and if the intelligence is received by officers after the event has occurred, the process is equally fruitless. 
Therefore, to make this type of policing effective, four conditions must exist: (1) intelligence must be 
gathered; (2) this intelligence needs to be analyzed; (3) the information needs to be disseminated in a 
timely fashion; and (4) officers must take action in accordance with the received intelligence. 
 Successful execution of this method of policing is dependent on the inputting of intelligence into 
the system. The previous section discussed how local police officers are already providing this 
intelligence to regional and federal anti-terrorism agencies. Therefore, the first condition is being 
satisfied. 
 The next two conditions, analysis and dissemination of information, are still not fully developed. 
A strong intelligence repository is essential to this process and the fusion centers appear to be the best 
system currently in place. Fusion centers need to have analysts capable of making rapid and accurate 
judgments regarding terrorism activities. These judgments will often have to be made based on 
imperfect information making this task especially challenging. Despite this difficulty, this role is 
fundamental to successful implementation of intelligence-based policing. Equally important is the 
dissemination of this information to officers. Obviously, action based on intelligence requires the 
officers to have the intelligence. However, discretion and guidance also must be part of this process. 
Terrorism intelligence should be provided only when specific action needs to be taken. Additionally, the 
type of action to be taken should also be specifically stated. For example, some situations may require 
officers actually arrest certain individuals while other scenarios only necessitate further surveillance. The 
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analysts and their compatriots are the persons in the best position to make these evaluations. To 
accomplish this goal, political actors at the state, regional, and federal levels should provide ample 
resources to intelligence repositories like the fusion centers and access to this information needs to be 
enhanced. The inclusion of local law enforcement in this manner needs to be a priority of anti-terrorism 
policy makers.   
 A coherent training program should be developed and implemented by the federal government 
regarding the gathering of terrorism-related intelligence. Rather than having every department pick and 
choose how to teach this skill, standard instruction needs to be developed that can be utilized by all 
departments regardless of their location or budget. An online training course could be developed 
initially and made available to every department in the United States. Basic awareness of recent tactics, 
techniques, and other behaviors of terrorist organizations within the United States could serve as the 
foundation of this type of instruction. Over time, more extensive blocks of instruction could be 
developed. One officer interviewed described a training program he leads that lasts one week and 
involves classroom and live exercises that help to hone observational skills and intelligence gathering 
capabilities. Ideally, this type of program could be standardized and administered to all departments. 
 Federal anti-terrorism policy needs to be centralized and stream-lined. As described in Chapter 
2, numerous federal agencies currently have a role to play in the anti-terrorism effort. All of these 
organizations have their own sets of procedures, jurisdictions, and priorities and these differences only 
serve to complicate implementation efforts. As one interview subject pointed out, the federal 
government needs to define the roles between these agencies regarding anti-terrorism implementation. 
This type of clarification would likely streamline efforts and simplify matters for federal agencies as well 
as local departments. 
 The suggestions presented here are certainly not exhaustive. These recommendations do offer a 
starting point for discussions regarding the direction of anti-terrorism policy. Regardless of the actual 
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outcomes reached in the future, acknowledgement of the importance of local law enforcement in the 
implementation of such policy is essential and their inclusion in the decision making process would be 
beneficial. 
Theoretical implications: 
 Several of Lipsky’s (1980) theoretical expectations have been supported by the results of this 
project. The first of these expectations is satisfied since the goals of police officers are not necessarily 
congruent with the goals of officials responsible for the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. A 
couple of interview respondents mentioned that the primary focus of local law enforcement is not on 
preventing terrorism a reality that is in stark contrast to the goals of anti-terrorism policy 
implementation. Information asymmetry, the second expectation of LIpsky’s (1980) theory, is also 
clearly present. In the case of anti-terrorism policy, local level officers seldom have as much information 
regarding terrorism investigations and analysis compared to their superiors and other anti-terrorism 
personnel. There are definitely multiple principles overseeing the implementation of anti-terrorism 
policy confirming Lipsky’s third expectation. The FBI, DHS, and ICE are all federal agencies responsible 
for preventing terrorism. Additionally, local police chiefs and department homeland security officers are 
also tasked with implementing anti-terrorism policy. This creates a situation where line-level officers 
have a myriad of principles to report to regarding anti-terrorism activities. The fourth expectation, that 
local law enforcement officers have discretion regarding the implementation of anti-terrorism policy, is 
also met. All terrorism intelligence gathering efforts necessitate local police officer assistance yet these 
officers have considerable leeway in this process. Finally, as Lipsky (1980) predicted, the presence of 
these factors can result in implementation that is different from the original intent of anti-terrorism 
policy. Integration of local and federal agencies in the anti-terrorism effort may not be as effective as 
desired because of the goal incongruence, multiple principles, information asymmetry, and police officer 
discretion. 
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 This study reinforces the need for specifically investigating the relationship between street-level 
bureaucrats and policy implementation. To understand how these street-level bureaucrats are 
impacting anti-terrorism efforts it is necessary to obtain their opinions and understanding of the process 
and situation. Conclusions reached based on these opinions are vital to accurately portraying the 
implementation landscape, at least with regards to national anti-terrorism policy. For example, this 
policy area is particularly difficult to analyze. There are no dollar figures that can provide insight into 
how well terrorism is being prevented. Even arrest records only tell part of the story. Therefore, several 
limitations exist when assessing the efficacy of local anti-terrorism policy implementation.  
 The results and conclusions reached in this study provide evidence that information asymmetry 
is likely the dominant expectation predicting police behavior. The interviews and survey responses 
indicate a willingness among local law enforcement agents to engage in anti-terrorism efforts, and a 
belief that it is important for them to take an active role. However, many officers express an inability to 
assist in this manner due to lack of information. A difference in goals between police officers and other 
anti-terrorism agents does not greatly impact their decisions regarding anti-terrorism policy 
implementation. The number of principles requesting or requiring terrorism intelligence also does not 
appear to greatly influence decisions made by line officers. Rather, the lack of information appears to be 
the primary reason local police officers seldom focus on anti-terrorism efforts. This suggests that 
information asymmetry should be more closely examined within other policy arenas when testing 
Lipsky’s (1980) theory. 
 Emphasis on accountability may also be misplaced, at least based on the conclusions of this 
study. Certainly police officers are held accountable to their superiors, but anti-terrorism policy 
implementation is a little unique in that federal agencies do not appear to conduct such rigorous 
oversight of local police departments. Local police departments are not within any kind of chain of 
command that really allows for this type of oversight by the FBI, DHS, ICE, or any other federal law 
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enforcement agency. As a result, implementation of federal policy through local police departments 
does not adhere to typical accountability standards. Researchers interested in studying street-level 
bureaucrats should consider this implication when developing their studies by considering the 
complexity of this relationship between local bureaucracies and their federal counterparts. 
 Finally, this study looked at a broad policy area. Rather than looking at one specific policy, anti-
terrorism policy in its entirety was considered and analyzed which allowed for broader interpretations 
and perspectives from the respondents. Researchers interested in studying complex policies where 
street-level bureaucrats may not be aware of specific details of the policy should consider analysis of the 
general policy area. 
Future research: 
 The research done for this study has been informative regarding how police officers implement 
national anti-terrorism policy. Several important theoretical and policy implications were derived from 
the results of this research. However, there is much work that should be done to further develop and 
strengthen these findings. 
 First, the scope of the research conducted in this study should be broadened. Interviewing and 
surveying more police officers from several other communities around the country would make the 
results more generalizable to the entire country. Cities such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles 
should be included. But, smaller communities should also be analyzed from various regions of the 
United States. Similarities and differences between these communities would be valuable to 
determining the universality of certain opinions and perspectives. 
 Secondly, including specific analysis of federal agencies should be included. Nicholson-Crotty 
(2004) emphasized the importance of analyzing the federal and street-level perspectives of a policy in 
order to have a thorough and complete understanding of the mechanisms involved in the decision-
making process by both principles and agents. In this case, interviews and surveys of FBI and DHS 
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personnel would be extremely informative. The perspectives of these principles would provide greater 
understanding of the rationale behind the original policies therefore allowing for accurate interpretation 
of the original intent. This information could then be compared to the specific goals of the street-level 
bureaucrats tasked with implementing the policy. 
 Another avenue for future research would be to more closely link public opinion and police 
officer perspectives. Asking questions of local law enforcement that is identical to those asked of the 
public on various polls would be helpful to determine the differences, or similarities, between these 
perspectives and opinions. The public, whom police officers ostensibly serve, is an important component 
of the implementation of anti-terrorism policy. If the public is supportive of these efforts and in 
agreement on the importance of such policies, the implementation should, at least in theory, be more 
effective. Understanding these opinions and differences would add yet another layer of insight into this 
complex issue. 
 Finally, future research should attempt to link action to beliefs. Arrest rates, active 
investigations, and other anti-terrorism activities should be compared to the beliefs of officers. This may 
be challenging considering how few officers believe they are actively involved in anti-terrorism efforts, 
even though their beliefs may have a direct impact on anti-terrorism policy implementation. Obtaining 
these types of records is, however, problematic considering the classified nature of many of these 
investigations. Regardless, any evidence of this linkage that could be found would be useful to see if the 
results and conclusions found in this study are supported. This study has provided a glimpse into the 
role of street-level bureaucrats within anti-terrorism police implementation and serves as a strong 
foundation for future research. 
  
66 
 
DOJ DHS
FBI US Attorneys COPS TSA Intelligence ICE Secret Service
JTTFs Investigations NCTC
Collaboration with local 
law enforcement
Local law enforcement 
and Community 
Collaboration
Airport Security Fusion Centers
Alerted by state and 
local law enforcement
State and local 
assistance as needed
Collaboration with local 
law enforcement
Collaboration with local 
law enforcement
Investigate and 
prosecute
State and local creation 
and input
Immigration 
enforcement
Investigation of financial 
crimes
Investigate terrorism 
incidents
Interagency 
collaboration on 
terrorism incidents
Intelligence gathering 
and analysis
Color Key:
Lead agencies
Key agencies
Local law 
enforcement 
involvement
Anti-terrorism 
effort description
Notes:
- Chart based on information from DOJ, FBI, DHS, and Secret Service websites and interview responses
- Chart does not represent organizational charts for any; rather, this is descriptive of anti-terrorism role of agencies involved
 
 






73 
 
 
Table 2-1: Local Law Enforcement Role 
 
    Entity/Activity Description Fed Agencies Local Role 
JTTF's 
Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces 
FBI 
Provide intel; aid with 
investigations; assist with 
analysis 
Fusion Centers 
Intelligence 
repository 
DHS 
Operate fusion centers; 
provide and analyze intel; 
disseminate intel 
COP 
Community 
Oriented Policing 
Dept. of Justice 
Networking with local 
communities to increase 
intel gathering capabilities 
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Table 4-1: Community Information 
    
       
Community 
Population 
(2009) 
% White 
(2000) 
% Female 
(2000) 
Median 
Income 
(1999) 
Violent 
Crimes 
(2009) 
Number 
of Officers 
(2009) 
United States 307,006,550 
79.6% 
(2009) 
50.7% 
(2009) 
$25,029 
(2008) 1,318,398 706,886 
Kansas City, 
Missouri 484,684 60.7% 51.7 $37,198  6,303 1,392 
Gladstone, 
Missouri 28,454 94.7% 50.70% $46,535  70 42 
North Kansas 
City, Missouri 5,876 82.5% 52.50% $28,674  21 39 
Overland Park, 
Kansas 173,688 90.6% 51.60% $62,116  308 251 
Shawnee, Kansas 62,508 90.5% 50.80% $59,626  106 85 
Lawrence, 
Kansas 91,703 83.8% 50.30% $34,669  424 137 
Topeka, Kansas 123,449 78.5% 52.00% $35,928  715 283 
Leavenworth, 
Kansas 
34,993 
(2006) 76.8% 47.10% $40,681  N/A 66 
       Data sources: www.census.gov and www.fbi.gov 
   
       According to the FBI website, violent crimes are “composed of four offenses: murder and  
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Violent crimes  
are defined in the UCR [Uniform Crime Reporting] Program as those offenses which 
 involve force or threat of force” (www.fbi.gov). 
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Table 4-2: Benchmark Cities (2008) 
   
     
City 
Population, 
2009 
Violent 
Crime, 2009 
Number of 
Officers, 2009 
Median 
Income, 1999 
Overland Park, Kansas 173,688 308 251 $62,116  
Bellevue, Washington 125,054 162 175 $62,338  
Boise, Idaho 206,437 538 288 $42,432  
Alameda, California 70,372 199 91 $56,285  
Fremont, California 202,714 490 177 $76,579  
Chula Vista, California 224,841 747 232 $44,861  
Ft. Collins, Colorado 138,487 535 169 $44,459  
Boulder, Colorado 100,035 245 166 $44,748  
Lakewood, Colorado 140,618 689 275 $48,109  
Lincoln, Nebraska 254,438 1,165 319 $40,605  
Olathe, Kansas 123,321 264 N/A $61,111  
Broken Arrow, 
Oklahoma 94,415 180 122 $53,507  
Edmond, Oklahoma 80,889 87 114 $54,556  
Norman, Oklahoma 108,152 162 159 $36,713  
Irving, Texas 202,447 604 344 $44,956  
San Angelo, Texas 92,269 368 158 $32,232  
Richardson, Texas 102,675 230 147 $62,392  
Garland, Texas 218,872 608 319 $49,156  
Plano, Texas 272,747 464 337 $78,722  
Springfield, Missouri 156,659 1,197 295 $29,563  
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 128,779 403 202 $43,704  
Naperville, Illinois 144,731 N/A 185 $88,771  
Chesapeake, Virginia 223,261 831 371 $50,743  
Boca Raton, Florida 85,956 217 192 $60,248  
Coral Springs, Florida 125,656 338 190 $58,459  
     Data sources: www.census.gov and www.fbi.gov 
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Table 5-1: Interview Subjects Information 
    
       
Jurisdiction # of Interviews 
Avg 
Age Race(s) Gender(s) Avg Exp Duration 
Gladstone, MO 2 33 Wht, Lat Male 10 1/2 0:46:15 
Lawrence, KS 3 48 White Male 26 1/3 1:22:32 
Leavenworth, KS 3 50 White Male 28 2/3 1:50:23 
Kansas City, MO 2 46 White Male 20 1/2 2:07:14 
Overland Park, KS 3 55 1/3 White Male 33 1/3 2:22:46 
N. Kansas City, MO 2 46 White Male 23 1/4 1:01:57 
Shawnee, KS 3 40 White Male 18 1/3 1:44:28 
Topeka, KS 1 61 White Male 38     0:38:45 
 
Table 5-2: Respondent Knowledge of Policy 
 
    Knowledge Level Fed Policy State Policy Dept Policy 
Do not know 39.9% 52.9% 30.6% 
Know some 50.3% 39.7% 22.5% 
Know most 9.2% 6.8% 19.9% 
Know all 0.7% 0.7% 10.0% 
No policy N/A N/A 17.0% 
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Table 5-3: Relationship with Federal Government 
     
         
Variable 
% Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% Strongly 
Disagree & 
Disagree 
% 
Don't 
Know 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% Agree & 
Strongly 
Agree 
No 
Policy 
Dept works well 
with feds 5.2% 13.7% 19.0% 59.5% 19.8% 1.7% 21.6% N/A 
Fed policy well 
communicated to 
dept 8.3% 34.1% 42.4% 41.9% 15.1% 0.7% 15.7% N/A 
Feds have 
prepared dept well 9.2% 29.7% 38.9% 39.5% 20.3% 1.3% 21.6% N/A 
Fed policy is 
effective 4.4% 15.5% 19.9% 43.4% 35.6% 1.1% 36.7% N/A 
Fed policy has 
helped dept 
prevent terrorism 13.9% 10.0% 13.7% 72.1% 13.3% 0.4% 13.7% 0.2% 
Dept receives intel 
from feds 4.4% 10.0% 14.4% 48.3% 32.3% 5.0% 37.3% N/A 
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Table 5-4: Terrorism Threat & Local Police Role 
 
     
Rating 
Raw Data for 
Terrorism 
Threat 
% of 
Respondents 
Making 
Choice for 
Threat 
Raw Data for 
Local Officer 
Worthiness 
% of 
Respondents 
Making 
Choice for 
Worthiness 
0 18 3.9% 11 2.4% 
1 22 4.8% 2 0.4% 
2 32 7.0% 7 1.5% 
3 28 6.1% 10 2.2% 
4 27 5.9% 18 3.9% 
5 86 18.7% 65 14.2% 
6 45 9.8% 24 5.2% 
7 62 13.5% 65 14.2% 
8 63 13.7% 98 21.4% 
9 22 4.8% 43 9.4% 
10 54 11.8% 116 25.3% 
Disagree, 0-
3 100 21.8% 30 6.5% 
Mixed, 4-6 158 34.4% 107 23.3% 
Agree, 7-10 201 43.8% 322 70.2% 
     Scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree 
  
Table 5-5: Anti-terrorism Activities per Month 
   Times/month Raw Number of Responses % of Total Responses 
0-5 434 94.8% 
6-10 8 1.7% 
11-15 1 0.2% 
16-20 2 0.4% 
21-25 1 0.2% 
26+ 12 2.6% 
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Table 5-6: Impact of Federal Policy on Job Execution 
   
RESPONSE 
Fed Policy 
Does Not 
Prevent Other 
Investigations 
Fed Policy 
Does Not 
Prevent 
Other 
Tasks 
Strongly disagree 2.0% 1.3% 
Disagree 2.0% 1.3% 
Don't know 26.9% 22.4% 
Agree 53.3% 58.2% 
Strongly agree 15.9% 16.8% 
Strongly disagree and Disagree 3.9% 2.6% 
Strongly agree and Agree 69.2% 74.9% 
 
Table 5-7: Resource Availability within Department 
   
RESPONSE 
% Responses 
for Cost 
Effectiveness 
% Responses 
for Good Use 
of Resources 
Strongly disagree 2.7% 4.1% 
Disagree 5.3% 8.5% 
Don't know 77.0% 14.8% 
Agree 14.2% 58.6% 
Strongly agree 2.0% 13.9% 
Strongly disagree and Disagree 6.8% 12.6% 
Agree and Strongly agree 16.2% 72.5% 
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Table 5-8: Anti-terrorism Implementation has not Interfered with other Duties 
        
Response Options 
Raw Data of Responses 
Selecting Options 
% of Total Responses 
Selecting Options 
     0 10 2.2% 
     1 7 1.5% 
     2 11 2.4% 
     3 5 1.1% 
     4 12 2.6% 
     5 65 14.2% 
     6 22 4.8% 
     7 60 13.1% 
     8 104 22.7% 
     9 66 14.4% 
     10 97 21.1% 
     Disagree, 0-3 33 7.2% 
     Mixed, 4-6 99 21.6% 
     Agree, 7-10 327 71.2% 
     
        Scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree 
     
Table 5-9: Anti-terrorism Efforts have had Negative Impact on Community Relationship 
       
Response Options 
Raw Data of 
Option Selections 
% of Total 
Responses 
Selecting Options 
    Strongly Disagree 71 15.5% 
    Disagree 227 49.5% 
    Don't know 152 33.1% 
    Agree 8 1.7% 
    Strongly Agree 1 0.2% 
    Strongly disagree and Disagree 298 64.9% 
    Agree and Strongly Agree 9 2.0% 
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Table 5-10: Community Has been Helpful with Anti-terrorism Efforts 
       Response 
Options 
Raw Data of Response 
Selections 
% of Total Response 
Selections 
    0 32 7.0% 
    1 26 5.7% 
    2 38 8.3% 
    3 35 7.7% 
    4 40 8.8% 
    5 166 36.3% 
    6 41 9.0% 
    7 39 8.5% 
    8 32 7.0% 
    9 4 0.9% 
    10 4 0.9% 
    Disagree, 0-3 131 28.7% 
    Mixed, 4-6 247 54.0% 
    Agree, 7-10 79 17.3% 
    
       Scale: 0 = "Strongly Disagree", 10 = "Strongly Agree" 
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Table 5-11: Police Opinions and Public 
Opinions 
  Responses % Agree 
Officer Survey Responses: 
 Fed policy is effective 36.7% 
Dept and feds work well together 21.6% 
Dept does all it can to implement 
policy 35.3% 
Anti-terrorism policy worth 
implementing by local police 70.2% 
Terrorism is a threat to the 
community 43.8% 
Public Survey Responses: 
 
Very/somewhat worried someone 
in family will be victim of terrorism 42% 
Have confidence in govt to protect 
from terrorism 73% 
Likely there will terrorist attack in 
2006 45% 
Govt agencies have made country 
safer from terrorism 72% 
There will be an attack in next year 36% 
Terrorists are likely to attack 
smaller cities 67% 
Major changes needed in govt 
agencies that prevent terrorism 63% 
  Polling data found at www.gallup.com 
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Table 5-12: Gallup Poll Variables Information 
 
    Variable Year Question Options 
WORRY 2010 
How worried are you that you or 
someone in your family will become a 
victim of terrorism? 
Very, somewhat, 
not too, not at all 
CONFIDENCE 2006 
How much confidence do you have in 
the U.S. government to protect its 
citizens from future terrorist attacks? 
A great deal, a fair 
amount, not very 
much, none at all 
2006_ATTACK 2005 
Just your best guess, do you think it is 
likely - or unlikely - that there will be 
a major terrorist attack in the United 
States in 2006? 
Likely, unlikely, no 
opinion 
GOVT_EFFECT 2005 
Thinking now about the government 
agencies responsible for preventing 
terrorist attacks in the United States, 
do you think the actions of these 
agencies since September 11, 2001, 
have made the country: 
A lot safer, a little 
safer, no 
difference, a little 
less safe, a lot less 
safe, no opinion 
ATTACK 2004 
Do you think there will - or will not - 
be a major terrorist attack in the 
United States over the next twelve 
months? 
Yes, will; no, will 
not; no opinion 
TARGET 2004 
Which comes closer to your view 
about where terrorists would be 
likely to target an attack against the 
United States:  
Only New York City 
or big cities; any 
place in the U.S.; 
no opinion 
CHANGE 2004 
Based on what you have heard or 
read, do you think the government 
agencies responsible for preventing 
terrorist attacks in the United States 
are in need of: 
Complete 
overhaul, major 
reforms, minor 
reforms, no 
reforms at all, no 
opinion 
    All data from www.gallup.com 
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Appendix A: 
 
Interview Questions for “National Security Policy Influence on Street-Level Bureaucrats” Project 
 
1. Demographic Information: 
a. Name, position, gender, party identification, ideology, age, and religious affiliation 
2. Professional (law enforcement, political, etc.) training 
3. Why did you want to become a police officer? 
4. How long have you been in law enforcement? How long with your current agency? 
5. What is your unit’s anti-terrorism policy (in own words)? 
6. How often have you had cause to investigate a suspected terrorist incident? 
7. What anti- or counter-terrorism training have you had? 
8. Have you made a specific effort to search for terrorists and/or terrorist activity? 
9. How has anti-terrorism policy changed during your time on the force? 
10. How much of a threat is terrorism within your community? 
11. How are resources allocated relative to anti-terrorism efforts? 
12. How would you describe the “average” terrorist? 
13. What activities would you consider likely to be that of a terrorist or terrorist organization? 
14. How much discretion do you have to determine which leads to follow-up and which to ignore 
relative to possible terrorist activity? 
15. How much interaction do you have with local communities regarding terrorism prevention? 
16. How important is anti-terrorism policy relative to the execution of your job? 
17. How interested are you in pursuing potential terrorism leads? 
18. Do you feel additional pressure to pursue/follow-up on terrorism leads from your superiors and/or 
the community at large? 
19. How do you view your role in the broader anti-terrorism effort nationwide? 
20. Has federal anti-terrorism policy impacted your work expectations from your superiors, politicians, 
and the community? 
21. Has anti-terrorism efforts impacted your ability to adequately enforce other laws and pursue other 
crimes? 
22. Have anti-terrorism efforts created any conflict between law enforcement and local communities? 
23. When considering anti-terrorism policy execution, how important are the feelings and opinions of 
your local community that you serve? 
24. How effectively are you, personally, executing anti-terrorism mandates? 
25. What anti-terrorism mandates/orders have you been given? 
26. In what ways is it best to determine the success, or failure, of anti-terrorism efforts? 
27. What changes would you make to anti-terrorism policy? 
 
  
85 
 
Appendix B: 
 
Directions: Please answer the following questions about anti-terrorism policy to the best of your ability. 
Please do not put your name on this survey. This survey should take approximately 5-7 minutes to 
complete. Thank you for your time and assistance with this survey. 
For questions 1 through 23, please circle the answer that, in your opinion, best answers each question. 
1. Number of years as a law enforcement officer (circle one): 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16+ years 
 
2. Number of years at current position (circle one): 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16+ years 
 
3. Do you know the federal government’s anti-terrorism policy? 
1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
 
4. Do you know your state’s anti-terrorism policy? 
1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
 
5. Do you know your department’s anti-terrorism policy? 
1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
  
86 
 
6. Your department’s anti-terrorism policy is similar to federal anti-terrorism policy (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
7. The federal government has done a high quality job of preparing my department to prevent 
terrorism (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
8. Federal anti-terrorism policy is effective (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
9. Federal anti-terrorism policy is adequately communicated to my department (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
10. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from investigating other crimes (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
11. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from completing other job related tasks 
(circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
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4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
12. Anti-terrorism policy is cost effective within my department (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
13. Federal anti-terrorism policy has helped my department prevent terrorism (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
14. Your role within your department is directly involved in preventing terrorism (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
15. You have received adequate anti-terrorism training (circle one): 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
16. How much time do you spend on anti-terrorism activities per week? 
1. 0-5 hours 
2. 6-10 hours 
3. 11-15 hours 
4. 16-20 hours 
5. 21+ hours 
 
17. Taking steps to prevent terrorism is a worthwhile use of your department’s resources. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
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2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
18. Your department and the federal government work well together with regards to executing anti-
terrorism policy. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
19. Your department receives anti-terrorism intelligence form the federal government in a timely 
manner. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
20. Your department does as much as it should to help the national anti-terrorism effort. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
21. Anti-terrorism efforts you have conducted have had a negative impact on your relationship with 
your community. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
22. Anti-terrorism policy within my department has changed significantly since 2001. 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
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5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
23. You, typically, have the opportunity to actively engage in anti-terrorism activities about how 
many times a month: 
1. 0-5 times 
2. 6-10 times 
3. 11-15 times 
4. 16-20 times 
5. 21-25 times 
6. 26+ times 
For questions 24 through 28, circle the number on the scale that best represents your opinion. 0 = 
strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree 
24. The community you serve has been helpful in your efforts to prevent and/or respond to terrorist 
activity. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
25. Anti-terrorism policy is something worth doing at the local level. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
26. Terrorism is a threat within your community. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
27. Anti-terrorism policy expectations have not interfered with your ability to carry out your law 
enforcement duties. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
28. You frequently investigate terrorism threats. 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Questions 29 and 30 are on a different scale, please pay close attention to the scale for each question 
and circle the number that most closely represents you. 
29. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your partisanship (Democrat or Republican): 
Strong          Strong 
Democrat         Republican 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
30. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your ideology (liberal or conservative): 
Strong          Strong 
Liberal          Conservative 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
For questions 31 through 33 please circle the answer that most accurately describes you. 
31. Gender: 
1. Female 
2. Male 
 
32. Race: 
1. White 
2. African American 
3. Asian 
4. Latino 
5. Other (please specify): __________________________ 
 
33. Age: 
1. 20-25 
2. 26-30 
3. 31-35 
4. 36-40 
5. 41-45 
6. 46-50 
7. 51-55 
8. 55+ 
 
34. Please use the space below to add any further comments you may have regarding the 
effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy implementation within your department. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix C: 
 
CODE BOOK FOR SUVERY 
(** Bolded names refer to variable names in data set.) 
ID: number assigned to each respondent. Prefix 19XXX are respondents from the on-line survey. 
Respondents prefix 18XXX are from Lawrence, KS. Respondents prefix 17XXX are from Shawnee, KS. 
Respondents prefix 16XXX are from Gladstone, MO. Respondents prefix 15XXX are from North Kansas 
City, MO. Respondents 14XXX are from Leavenworth, KS. Respondents prefix 13XXX are from 
Independence, MO. Respondents 12XXX are from Kansas City, MO. Respondents 11XXX are from 
Raytown, MO. 
 
1. Number of years as a law enforcement officer (circle one): YEARSEX 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16+ years 
 
2. Number of years at current position (circle one): YEARSCP 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16+ years 
 
3. Do you know the federal government’s anti-terrorism policy? FED_POLICY 
1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
 
4. Do you know your state’s anti-terrorism policy? STATE_POLICY 
1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
 
5. Do you know your department’s anti-terrorism policy? DEPT_POLICY 
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1. I do not know the policy 
2. I know some of the policy 
3. I know most of the policy 
4. I know all of the policy 
5. My departments does not have a policy 
 
6. Your department’s anti-terrorism policy is similar to federal anti-terrorism policy (circle one): 
PARITY_POLICY 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
6. My department does not have a policy 
 
7. The federal government has done a high quality job of preparing my department to prevent 
terrorism (circle one): FED_QUALITY 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
8. Federal anti-terrorism policy is effective (circle one): FED_EFFECT 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
9. Federal anti-terrorism policy is adequately communicated to my department (circle one): 
FED_COM 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
10. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from investigating other crimes (circle one): 
FED_CRIME 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
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2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
11. Federal anti-terrorism policy does not prevent me from completing other job related tasks 
(circle one): FED_JOB 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
12. Anti-terrorism policy is cost effective within my department (circle one): COST 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
6. N/A 
 
13. Federal anti-terrorism policy has helped my department prevent terrorism (circle one): 
PREVENT 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
6. N/A 
 
14. Your role within your department is directly involved in preventing terrorism (circle one): ROLE 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
15. You have received adequate anti-terrorism training (circle one): TRAINING 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
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4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
16. How much time do you spend on anti-terrorism activities per week? TIME 
1. 0-5 hours 
2. 6-10 hours 
3. 11-15 hours 
4. 16-20 hours 
5. 21+ hours 
 
17. Taking steps to prevent terrorism is a worthwhile use of your department’s resources. 
RESOURCES 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
18. Your department and the federal government work well together with regards to executing anti-
terrorism policy. RELATION 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
19. Your department receives anti-terrorism intelligence form the federal government in a timely 
manner. INTEL 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
 
20. Your department does as much as it should to help the national anti-terrorism effort. HELP 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
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21. Anti-terrorism efforts you have conducted have had a negative impact on your relationship with 
your community. COM_IMPACT 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
6. N/A 
 
22. Anti-terrorism policy within my department has changed significantly since 2001. 
POLICY_CHANGE 
1. Strongly disagree (1) 
2. Disagree (2) 
3. Don’t know (3) 
4. Agree (4) 
5. Strongly agree (5) 
6. N/A 
 
23. You, typically, have the opportunity to actively engage in anti-terrorism activities about how 
many times a month: ENGAGE 
1. 0-5 times 
2. 6-10 times 
3. 11-15 times 
4. 16-20 times 
5. 21-25 times 
6. 26+ times 
For questions 24 through 28, circle the number on the scale that best represents your opinion. 0 = 
strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree 
24. The community you serve has been helpful in your efforts to prevent and/or respond to terrorist 
activity. COM_HELP 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
25. Anti-terrorism policy is something worth doing at the local level. POLICY_LOCAL 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
26. Terrorism is a threat within your community. COM_THREAT 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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27. Anti-terrorism policy expectations have not interfered with your ability to carry out your law 
enforcement duties. INTERFERE 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
28. You frequently investigate terrorism threats. INVESTIGATE 
Strongly Disagree        Strongly Agree 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Questions 29 and 30 are on a different scale, please pay close attention to the scale for each question 
and circle the number that most closely represents you. 
29. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your partisanship (Democrat or Republican): 
PARTY 
Strong          Strong 
Democrat         Republican 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
30. Circle the number on the scale that best represents your ideology (liberal or conservative): 
IDEOLOGY 
Strong          Strong 
Liberal          Conservative 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
For questions 31 through 33 please circle the answer that most accurately describes you. 
31. Gender: GENDER 
1. Female 
2. Male 
 
32. Race: RACE 
1. White 
2. African American 
3. Asian 
4. Latino (Includes Mexican-American) 
5. Native American 
6. Multi-racial/ethnic 
7. Pacific Islander 
 
33. Age: AGE 
1. 20-25 
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2. 26-30 
3. 31-35 
4. 36-40 
5. 41-45 
6. 46-50 
7. 51-55 
8. 55+ 
 
34. Please use the space below to add any further comments you may have regarding the 
effectiveness of federal anti-terrorism policy implementation within your department. 
COMMENTS 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix D: 
 
Master’s Thesis Interview Summaries: 
 
Name of interviewee:       
Date of interview: Click here to enter a date. 
Recording Code:        
Department: Choose an item. 
Rank/Position/Job:       
Years as officer:       
Age:       
Gender: Choose an item. 
Race: Choose an item. 
Party affiliation: Choose an item. 
Ideology: Choose an item. 
Religious affiliation: Choose an item. 
Investigated Terrorism:  Choose an item. 
 
Terrorism definition: 
      
Department’s terrorism policy: 
      
Terrorism training: 
      
Threat of terrorism in community: 
      
Local law enforcement role in national terrorism effort: 
      
Relationship with other departments/agencies (local, state, federal): 
      
How to measure terrorism policy: 
      
Balance between security and liberty: 
      
What changes needed: 
      
Other notable comments/information: 
      
Interviewer comments: 
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